The Quad’s Nuts and Bolts

Despite the pandemic-induced global recession, each of the current Quad members continues to increase their defense budgets to reflect the realization that more and more resources will need to be directed at the Indo-Pacific to ensure the region is not shaped by China unilaterally.

Stephen R. Nagy

August 8, 2024

3–4 minutes

Excerpt from my article “Quad-Plus? Carving out Canada’s Middle Power Role“

First, the Quad currently consists of the United States and three middle powers: Australia, India, and Japan. Among them, Australia is a self-professed middle power that belongs to middle-power groups such as MIKTA, an informal foreign ministry-led partnership between Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia. India is considered a future great power, while Japan, arguably a great power in terms of potential, behaves as a middle power by “maintaining of the international order through coalition-building, by serving as mediators and “go-betweens,” and through international conflict management and resolution activities.”

As outlined in the Lowy Institute’s Asian Power Indices between 2018 and 2020, the fluidity of the power, capacities, and capabilities that each of the current Quad members possesses suggests that any institution based on contemporary metrics of each state’s capacities may be outdated as the balance of power in the region continues to shift toward China.

The fluidity of power and the shift toward China are even more salient in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, as China has enhanced its assertive behavior in its periphery, evidenced by the Sino–Indian border violence in May, hyperbole toward Taiwan, enhanced gray-zone and blue-hull naval operations in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS), and the adoption of the new National Security Law in Hong Kong in June 2020.

Second, in terms of defense spending, the current Quad members bring significant resources to the Indo-Pacific table. In order of defense budgets, the United States brings approximately 750 billion USD, India 61 billion USD, Japan around 49 billion USD, and Australia 26 billion USD to the collective military resources of the Quad.

For instance, the July 2020 Australian Strategic Defence Update envisions a region that will demand more robust maritime, submarine, and strike capabilities to defend itself in the coming decades.

In its 2021 defense budget request, Japan plans a record 5.49 trillion Yen, focusing on space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum. These are meant to deal with immediate challenges, such as North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and missile development and the long-term challenge of China’s reemergence as the dominant organizing state in the region and determination to reorganize the region to protect Beijing’s core interests.

The United States and India have increased their military budgets as well. In the case of the United States, its Indo-Pacific Strategy and defense budget proposal demand increased resources be developed and deployed in the region to counter China’s revisionist behavior.

India continues to increase its military spending to push back against a growing Chinese maritime presence in the Indian Ocean, a military presence along the Indo–China border, and China’s support for India’s archrival, Pakistan.

Third, if we compared where most of the defense and military assets are deployed, we find that Japan, Australia, and India have deployed most of their assets in their near abroad.

For Japan, that means throughout the Japanese archipelago, the ECS, the SCS, and parts of the Indian Ocean. Australia, in contrast, has deployed the majority of its military assets in the Pacific Islands area, SCS, and parts of the Indian Ocean. India deploys most of its assets in the Indian Ocean and along its northern borders with China and Pakistan. Even though the United States has a global deployment of its assets, it started titling its resources to the Asian region, first under the Obama administration’s Rebalancing Strategy, and accelerated under the Trump administration through its Indo-Pacific Strategy.

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Quad-Plus? Carving out Canada’s Middle Power Role Download