How Beijing and Moscow are fracturing the free world

In Giuliano da Empoli’s 2022 novel “The Wizard of the Kremlin,” the protagonist Vadim Baranov — a fictionalized version of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s political technologist Vladislav Surkov — articulates a chilling doctrine that has become a defining geopolitical reality. Modern cyber conflict is not about sending a winning message to convince the other side that you are correct, he explains. Rather, it is about creating deep fissures in an adversary’s society, rendering it less cohesive, less unified and ultimately paralyzed by distrust.

As the world navigates geopolitical friction in 2026, this philosophy has been adopted by the Chinese Communist Party. Beijing, operating in strategic alignment with Moscow, is waging a sustained campaign of cyber-enabled disinformation against the United States, Japan and the broader Western alliance, as well as audiences in the Global South. The objective is not to promote authoritarianism directly, but to corrode the trust that sustains democratic societies and international cooperation grounded in rule of law, transparency, political accountability and a free civil society.

To understand this form of cognitive warfare, it is useful to revisit the work of 20th-century political philosopher Hannah Arendt, who diagnosed the mechanics of totalitarian deception with striking clarity.  As Arendt famously observed, systematic and constant lying is not aimed at making the people believe the lies, but at ensuring that no one believes anything anymore. A public that can no longer distinguish between truth and falsehood, she argued, cannot distinguish between right and wrong and becomes vulnerable to manipulation.

Disinformation campaigns linked to China and Russia are designed to produce precisely this effect. Their aim is to dilute shared understandings of truth while amplifying the perceived failures of democratic systems. By flooding the information environment with contradictory narratives, amplifying fringe viewpoints through algorithmic systems and manufacturing outrage, these efforts seek to exhaust citizens’ capacity to assess reality.

Beijing’s approach to this strategy has evolved significantly. Earlier attention focused on the so-called 50 Cent Army, or wumaodang — online commentators reportedly paid to post pro-government content, counter criticism and disrupt organic discourse. By 2026, however, this model has become more sophisticated. It is increasingly institutionalized, partly privatized and augmented by artificial intelligence.

Political economist Lynette Ong, in “Outsourcing Repression: Everyday State Power in Contemporary China,” describes how authoritarian systems often subcontract elements of coercion, censorship and surveillance to nonstate actors. More recent research on “outsourcing surveillance” points to a growing ecosystem in which Chinese authorities rely on private technology firms and state-linked enterprises to manage online public opinion.

This system is not only about plausible deniability; it expands state capacity. By leveraging private-sector expertise in big data analytics, AI-driven sentiment analysis and automated content generation, authorities can more effectively monitor discourse and shape narratives. These capabilities are not confined to domestic use. They are increasingly deployed to influence foreign audiences and inject divisive narratives into global information flows.

The implications extend well beyond China’s borders. Messaging that frames the U.S.-Japan alliance as destabilizing or dismisses Western engagement with developing countries as “Cold War thinking,” or neocolonialism, reflects a broader effort to reshape international perceptions.

Japan and the United States are primary targets of this information strategy. The narratives promoted are often tailored and persistent.

One line of messaging portrays Japan as remilitarizing and reverting to its imperial past, an argument aimed at isolating Tokyo from regional partners and undermining security cooperation. This narrative has intensified following Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s Nov. 7 remarks that a conflict involving Taiwan could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, potentially allowing the country to exercise collective self-defense through the deployment of its Self-Defense Forces. As I’ve written in past columns, this is a position consistent with Japan’s existing legal framework but widely amplified and distorted in regional information campaigns.

Another narrative emphasizes Japan’s vulnerability and lack of safety. During the release of treated wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear plant, for example, online campaigns amplified fears and encouraged economic backlash, illustrating how information operations can intersect with economic pressure.

At the same time, messaging directed at U.S. audiences frequently emphasizes themes of decline. Political polarization is magnified and the country is depicted as divided, unreliable and incapable of sustained leadership. Such narratives are designed not only to shape foreign perceptions, but also to deepen domestic divisions.

Western institutions are also a target. NATO and the Group of Seven are often portrayed as outdated or trapped in “Cold War thinking,” reinforcing a narrative that these alliances are sources of instability rather than mechanisms for collective security.

The cumulative effect of these campaigns is potentially profound. If publics in democratic societies lose confidence in alliances, institutions or even the possibility of objective truth, the foundations of collective security weaken. Deterrence can erode without a single shot being fired as internal division undermines the ability to respond coherently to external threats.

Addressing this challenge requires moving beyond reactive fact-checking toward a more systematic approach to what might be called cognitive defense.

First, governments should consider targeting the entities that enable disinformation campaigns. Applying principles similar to those used in counterterrorism finance, the United States, Japan and their partners could identify and sanction companies and organizations involved in coordinated information manipulation. Restricting access to international financial systems and technology ecosystems would raise the cost of such activities.

Second, allies can expand efforts to anticipate and expose disinformation before it spreads widely. Proactive disclosure of information about ongoing campaigns — sometimes described as “prebunking” — can help build public awareness and resilience. When audiences understand the tactics being used, they may be less susceptible to manipulation.

Third, strengthening societal resilience is essential. Media literacy and critical thinking skills can help individuals evaluate sources and recognize misleading content. At the same time, policymakers continue to debate how best to address the role of digital platforms, particularly the ways in which algorithmic systems may amplify polarizing or misleading material.

Ultimately, the challenge is not only technological but political and societal. As Arendt warned, a society that loses its capacity for judgment becomes vulnerable to the “rule of lies.” Disinformation campaigns, whether state-directed or outsourced, are not simply a nuisance. They represent a strategic effort to undermine the informational foundations of democratic governance.

If left unaddressed, these dynamics risk deepening divisions within and among democratic societies. The result would not necessarily be a decisive victory for authoritarian systems, but rather a gradual weakening of the institutions and norms that sustain open societies.

The stakes are therefore high. Defending the integrity of information is increasingly inseparable from defending political stability and international order. Without credible, shared understandings of reality, cooperation becomes more difficult, accountability weakens and the space for manipulation grows.

The question facing democratic governments is whether they can adapt quickly enough to meet this challenge while preserving the openness that defines them. The answer will help shape not only the future of geopolitical competition, but also the resilience of truth itself.
First published with the Japan Times June 25th, 2026 (https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2026/06/25/world/beijing-moscow-fracture-free-world/)