

**STOSUNKI MIĘDZYNARODOWE
W REGIONIE INDO-PACYFIKU:
STRATEGIE PAŃSTW I INSTYTUCJE REGIONALNE**

**CZĘŚĆ I: STRATEGIE PAŃSTW
W REGIONIE INDO-PACYFIKU**

**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION:
STATES' STRATEGIES AND REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS**

**VOLUME I: STATES' STRATEGIES
IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION**

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Spis treści / Contents

Joanna Marszałek-Kawa, Roberto Rabel, Jakub Zajączkowski <i>Introduction: The Indo-Pacific Region in International Relations</i>	7
Marcin Grabowski <i>Zwrot w stronę Azji i strategia Indo-Pacyfiku: analiza porównawcza strategii prezydentury Baracka Obamy i Donalda Trumpa wobec regionu Azji i Pacyfiku</i>	17
Barbara Regulska-Ingielewicz <i>Polityka handlowa Stanów Zjednoczonych w regionie Indo-Pacyfiku w latach 2010–2021</i>	83
Filip Grzegorzewski <i>Polityka Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec Tajwanu po zakończeniu zimnej wojny. Implikacje dla stosunków międzynarodowych w regionie Indo-Pacyfiku</i>	125
Edward Haliżak <i>Strategia Chin w regionie Indo-Pacyfiku. Perspektywa neoliberalnego instytucjonalizmu</i>	169
Stephen R. Nagy <i>The Origin and Evolution of Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) Vision</i>	219
Gurpreet S. Khurana <i>China's 'Rimland' Strategy and India's 'Indo-Pacific' Response</i>	255

Jakub Zajączkowski

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (<i>Quad</i>) w strategii Indii w regionie Indo-Pacyfiku	289
--	-----

Tomasz Okraska

Act East czy Look East? Polityka Indii w Azji Wschodniej w kontekście rywalizacji z Chińską Republiką Ludową	321
--	-----

Aleksandra Jaskólska

Pomoc rozwojowa jako instrument geoeconomicznej strategii Indii w regionie Indo-Pacyfiku po 2014 roku	353
---	-----

Łukasz Fijałkowski

Strategia Australii w regionie Indo-Pacyfiku	415
--	-----

Tomasz Łukaszuk

Indonesia as a Middle Power in the Indo-Pacific in the 21 st Century	445
---	-----

Barbara Kratiuk

Wietnam, Indo-Pacyfik i regionalna równowaga sił	479
--	-----

Michał Dahl, Joanna Marszałek-Kawa

The Philippines' Strategy Towards the Indo-Pacific Region	511
---	-----

Rashed Uz Zaman, Lailufar Yasmin

Bangladesh's Indo-Pacific Choices in Times of Systemic Volatility: Maintaining Strategic Friendship and Strategic Distance!	547
---	-----

Agnieszka Kuszewska-Bohnert

Polityka bezpieczeństwa Pakistanu wobec Indo-Pacyfiku	597
---	-----

Ewa Trojnar

Tajwan w regionie Indo-Pacyfiku: nowa polityka wobec Południa (New Southbound Policy)	643
---	-----

Wykaz autorów / Information about the authors	671
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The Origin and Evolution of Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) Vision

Korzenie i ewolucja japońskiej wizji wolnego i otwartego Indo-Pacyfiku (FOIP)

Abstract *Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision (FOIP) has moved to the forefront of Japan's foreign policy since 2017. Nonetheless, it remains elusive as a tangible strategy as activities that fall under FOIP continue to evolve. This chapter investigates critical junctures in FOIP's evolution between 2005 to today as it marks a demarcation point for articulating the use of the term Indo-Pacific. Key lines of enquiry include: 1) What and why have critical junctures pushed FOIP to evolve?; and 2) Are these changes being institutionalised? Findings suggest that Japan's FOIP vision evolution cannot solely be explained through neorealism or liberal institutionalism, rather, Japan's maritime strategy and its FOIP are sensitive to power distribution changes associated with China's re-emergence as the dominant power in the region and the relative decline of the U.S. and that it adapts to these changes through a hybrid approach. This approach includes: 1) a selective accommodation of China's rise; 2) deeply integrating Japan into the Indo-Pacific politico-economy and rules-making process; 3) tightening the Japan-U.S. alliance and cementing the U.S. into the region; and 4) diversifying and deepening its strategic partnerships.*

Keywords *Japan, Indo-Pacific, free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)*

Abstrakt *Od 2017 r. japońska wizja wolnego i otwartego Indo-Pacyfiku (FOIP) figuruje na pierwszym planie japońskiej polityki zagranicznej. Niemniej pozostaje ona nieuchwytna jako konkretna strategia, ponieważ działania objęte FOIP stale ewoluują. W tym rozdziale zbadano krytyczne momenty w ewolucji FOIP od 2005 r. do chwili obecnej, ponieważ wyznaczają one punkt rozgraniczenia dla określenia użycia terminu „Indo-Pacyfik”. Kluczowe kwestie to: 1) Jakie punkty krytyczne i dlaczego przymusiły ewolucję wizji FOIP? oraz 2) Czy zmiany te mają charakter zinstytucjonalizowany? Wyniki badań sugerują, że ewolucji japońskiej wizji FOIP nie można wytłumaczyć wyłącznie neorealizmem lub liberalnym instytucjonalizmem; raczej japońska strategia morska i jej wizja FOIP są wrażliwe na zmiany w dystrybucji siły związane z ponownym pojawieniem się Chin jako dominującej potęgi w regionie oraz względny spadek potęgi Stanów Zjednoczonych, a także że przystosowują się one do tych zmian przez podejście hybrydowe. Podejście to obejmuje: 1) selektywne dostosowanie się do wzrostu gospodarczego Chin; 2) głęboką integrację Japonii z gospodarką polityczną i procesem tworzenia reguł Indo-Pacyfiku; 3) zacieśnienie sojuszu Japonia–USA i cementowanie pozycji USA w regionie oraz 4) dywersyfikację i pogłębianie partnerstw strategicznych.*

Słowa kluczowe *Japan, Indo-Pacific, free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)*

Introduction

Japan's strategy in the Indo-Pacific region has become increasingly under question as it promotes its so-called “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision” (FOIP). Viewed from Beijing, the vision is understood as a containment strategy that works synergistically with the U.S. foreign policy to maintain its hegemonic position in the region¹. Other states such as Australia, India, and the E.U. view the vision primarily through the lens of a set of policy initiatives that aim to buttress the rules-based order through a process of accommodation of China's re-

¹ He Kai, Mingjiang Li, *Understanding the Dynamics of the Indo-Pacific: US-China Strategic Competition, Regional Actors, and Beyond*, “International Affairs” 2020, Vol. 96, No. 1, pp. 1–7.

-emergence as the dominant economy in the region and hedging, primarily through the Japan-U.S. alliance².

Examining Japan's foreign policy towards the Indo-Pacific (Asia-Pacific) within the parameters of this chapter, Yoshimatsu (2020) has grouped research done on Japan's foreign policy into four categories: 1) pro-active security engagement in the region; 2) theoretical categorisations of the Abe administration's foreign policy; 3) the domestic policymaking in relation to the Abe administration's foreign policy; and 4) efforts to understand the underlying assumptions behind Japan's Indo-Pacific foreign policies³.

Interpretations of the pro-active security engagement in the region identified by Yoshimatsu include Suzuki and Wallace (2018), Gaens (2018), and Smith (2019). The former argue that foreign policy has been determined by the interaction of geopolitical vulnerability, pacifist influences, and "political revisionist self-limiting" postures resulting in an Indo-Pacific approach that is less securitised than one would predict based on the threats emerging out of North Korea and China's military expansion⁴. Smith largely concurs with these points stressing that real changes in Japan's foreign policy and defence posture have been "additive not innovative" with few in the Diet willing to deploy self-defence forces abroad⁵. Gaens (2018), in contrast, argues that Japan's foreign policy vis-à-vis the region demands a more engaged Japan at the regional and global level through the expansion and deepening of strategic partnerships⁶.

² S.R. Nagy, *Accommodation Versus Alliance: Japan's Prospective Grand Strategy in the Sino-US Competition*, "Asian Forum" 2020, Vol. 8, No. 5, pp. 1–18.

³ H. Yoshimatsu, *Japan's Asian Diplomacy: Power Transition, Domestic Politics, and Diffusion of Ideas*, Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore 2020, pp. 8–11.

⁴ S. Suzuki, C. Wallace, *Explaining Japan's Response to Geopolitical Vulnerability*, "International Affairs" 2018, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 711–734.

⁵ Sh.A. Smith, *Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2019, pp. 236–237.

⁶ G. Khandekar, B. Gaens (eds.), *Japan's Search for Strategic Security Partnerships*, Routledge, Abington–New York 2018.

Theoretical categorisations of the Abe administration's foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific fall on the continuum of balancing⁷ to hedging⁸, to Japan attempting to address concerns about entrapment and abandonment⁹. Collectively, these works attempt to explain the link between foreign policy changes in the Indo-Pacific and strategies to deal with security concerns associated with China's rise.

Scholars such as Mulgan (2018) and Shinoda (2018), who investigated domestic policymaking in relation to the Abe administration's foreign policy, argue that the long tenure of Abe provided the time and conditions to come up with and execute a consistent (and strategic) foreign policy for the Indo-Pacific that was not achievable for nearly two decades of revolving door leadership¹⁰.

Research to understand the underlying assumptions behind Japan's Indo-Pacific foreign policies has also been conducted to explain FOIP's normative character, that is the promotion of a rules-based order. Here, scholars such as Hatakeyama (2019), Asplund (2018), and Nagy (2021) have found that Japan has shifted away from a reactive,

⁷ K. Koga, *The Rise of China and Japan's Balancing Strategy: Critical Junctures and Policy Shifts in the 2010s*, "Journal of Contemporary China" 2016, Vol. 25, No. 101, pp. 777–791; A.P. Liff, *Unambivalent Alignment: Japan's China Strategy, the US Alliance, and the 'Hedging' Fallacy*, "International Relations of the Asia-Pacific" 2019, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 453–491; G. Pugliese, A. Insisa, *Sino-Japanese Power Politics: Might, Money and Minds*, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2017.

⁸ H.-S. Lin, *Dai Niji Abe Shinzo Naikaku no Taichu Hejingu Senryaku (Japan's Hedging Strategy Against China Under the Second Abe Cabinet)*, "Mondai to Kenkyu" 2014, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 27–63; K. Koga, *The Concept of "Hedging" Revisited: The Case of Japan's Foreign Policy Strategy in East Asia's Power Shift*, "International Studies Review" 2018, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 633–660.

⁹ L.P. Fatton, *A New Spear in Asia: Why is Japan Moving Toward Autonomous Defence?*, "International Relations of the Asia-Pacific" 2019, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 297–325; S.R. Nagy, *Japan's Proactive Pacifism: Investing in Multilateralization and Omnidirectional Hedging*, "Strategic Analysis" 2017, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 223–235.

¹⁰ M. Honma, A.G. Mulgan, *Political Economy of Agricultural Reform in Japan under Abe's Administration*, "Asian Economic Policy Review" 2018, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 128–144; T. Shinoda, *Seiken Kōai to Sengo Nihon Gaikō [Japan's Regime Shift and Postwar Foreign Policy]*, Chikura Shobō, Tokyo 2018.

agnostic foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific to one that prioritised the advocacy of a rules-based order in the region over explicit democracy and human rights promotion¹¹.

What is clear for security policy analysts is that the FOIP is ambiguous and seen as evolving to encompass different components. In a sense, it is seen as both a reactive and a proactive policy, fusing the concept of Japan as a reactive state¹² and Japan as a proactive stabiliser¹³.

Furthermore, Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision (FOIP) has moved to the forefront of Japan's foreign policy since 2017. Nonetheless, it remains elusive as a tangible strategy as activities that fall under FOIP continue to evolve. This chapter investigates critical junctures in FOIP's evolution between 2005 to today as it marks a demarcation point for articulating the use of the term Indo-Pacific. Key lines of enquiry include: 1) What and why have critical junctures pushed FOIP to evolve; and 2) Are these changes being institutionalised? Findings suggest that Japan's FOIP vision's evolution cannot solely be explained through neorealism or liberal institutionalism; rather, FOIP is sensitive to power distribution changes associated with China's re-emergence as the dominant power in the region and the relative decline of the U.S. and that it adapts to these changes through a hybrid approach. This approach includes: 1) a selective accommodation of

¹¹ K. Hatakeyama, *A Middle Power's Roles in Shaping East Asian Security Order: Analysis of Japan's Engagement from a Normative Perspective*, "Australian Journal of Politics & History" 2019, Vol. 65, No. 3, pp. 466–481; A. Asplund, *Normative Power Japan: Settling for 'Chinese Democracy'*, "Contemporary Japan" 2018, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 117–134; S. Nagy, *Sino-Japanese Reactive Diplomacy as Seen Through the Interplay of the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision (FOIP)*, "China Report" 2021, Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 7–21.

¹² K.E. Calder, *Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State*, "World Politics" 1988, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 517–541.

¹³ A. Liff, *Proactive Stabilizer: Japan's Security Role in the Asia-Pacific Security Order*, in: Y. Funabashi, G.J. Ikenberry (eds.), *The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism: Japan and the World Order*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington 2020, pp. 39–78.

China's rise; 2) deeply integrating Japan into the Indo-Pacific politico-economy and rules-making process; 3) tightening the Japan-U.S. alliance and cementing the U.S. into the region; and 4) diversifying and deepening its strategic partnerships.

The chapter is organised into five sections. The first section serves as a short theoretical framework setting out the key assumptions of this paper. Section two of the chapter provides a brief overview of the Indian and Pacific Oceans in Japan's Maritime Defence Strategy. Section three then looks at the evolution of Japanese maritime strategy from the end of the Cold War to the present. The fourth section then takes a more granular look at the Japanese approach to the Indo-Pacific region before concluding by returning to the core questions raised at the outset of this chapter. The chapter also touches upon Japan's approach since the advent of the Biden administration and since the onset of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, as both are illustrative of Japan's commitment to preserving a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

Theoretical Framing

Neorealism or Liberal Institutionalism? Japan's Hybrid Approach

Core assumptions of neorealism include that the behaviour of states in the international systems flows from the anarchic and state-centric nature of the system and that states compete to survive in this system¹⁴. According to this theoretical approach, states faced with a changing balance of power not in their favour would prosecute a balancing strategy by banding together with other states to balance the rising power. Here Mearsheimer (2001), argues that the balance

¹⁴ D. de Buck, M.O. Hosli, *Traditional Theories of International Relations*, in: M.O. Hosli, J. Selleslaghs (eds.), *The Changing Global Order*, Springer, Cham 2020, pp. 3–21.

of power theory would see states take a variety of approaches, from bandwagoning to buck-passing, to meet their security requirements. It could include external balancing through forming alliances and strategic partnerships with like-minded states and internal balancing to marshal a state's resources for the explicit purpose of meeting the challenge emanating from a rising power¹⁵.

Japan's signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in November 2020 and efforts to engage in third-country infrastructure and connectivity cooperation with China are strong evidence that Japan is not taking a zero-sum approach to its relations with Beijing despite security anxieties associated with its re-emergence as the dominant economy in the region.

Reflecting on these collaborative activities, a neorealist framework does not explain Japan's foreign policy choices in the Indo-Pacific. Rather, the economic and infrastructure cooperation that both Japan and China are engaging in is more akin to liberal institutionalism, which stresses that "in order for there to be peace in international affairs states must cooperate and in effect yield some of their sovereignty to create 'integrated communities' to promote economic growth and respond to regional and international security issues"¹⁶.

Moreover, Japan's engagement with China seems to embody the complex interdependence articulated by Nye and Keohane (1970), through which a comprehensive approach to bilateral relations is pursued with absolute gains through cooperation being prioritised¹⁷.

However, like the neorealist approach to analysing Japan's Indo-Pacific foreign policies, the liberal institutionalist model also has shortco-

¹⁵ J.J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, WW Norton & Company, New York 2001.

¹⁶ S. Lamt, *Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism*, in: J. Baylis, S. Smith (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, p. 213.

¹⁷ R. Keohane, J. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Little, Brown, Boston 1977, p. 25.

mings. It does not explain Japan's expanding and deepening number of strategic partnerships, the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance, or the national defence budget that aims to "realise cross-domain operations... acquire and strengthen capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum by focusing resources and leveraging Japan's superb science and technology enhance capabilities in maritime and air domains, stand-off defence capability, comprehensive air and missile defence capability and manoeuvre and deployment capability to effectively respond to various situations during cross-domain operations in close combination with capabilities in new domains"¹⁸, all of which have China in mind.

It also certainly does not explain the U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders' Statement: "U.S.-Japan Global Partnership for a New Era"¹⁹ on April 16, 2021 or the G7 Foreign and Development Ministers' Meeting: Communiqué²⁰, London, May 5, 2021 in which China was explicitly mentioned as a threat to regional peace, stability, and the rules-based order.

What is clear is that Japan's Indo-Pacific foreign policy can neither be fully explained by neorealism or liberal institutionalism, as Japan's behaviour demonstrates elements of both. Japan's behaviour is characterised by both hedging and engagement, as Japan is proactively attempting to have a major role in the rules-making process of the Indo-Pacific through a multipronged strategy of hedging with the U.S.,

¹⁸ Ministry of Defence (MOD), *Defence Programs and Budget of Japan-Overview of FY 2021 Budget*, 2021, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/d_budget/pdf/210331a.pdf (accessed: 14.12.2021).

¹⁹ *The White House, U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders' Statement: "U.S.-Japan Global Partnership for a New Era"*, 16.04.2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/16/u-s-japan-joint-leaders-statement-u-s-japan-global-partnership-for-a-new-era> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

²⁰ Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, *G7 Foreign and Development Ministers' Meeting: Communiqué*, 5.05.2021, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/g7-foreign-and-development-ministers-meeting-may-2021-communication/g7-foreign-and-development-ministers-meeting-communication-london-5-may-2021> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

and inculcating itself into the Indo-Pacific's political, security and economic architect while engaging with China pragmatically.

The limits of Japan's approach will be tested as geopolitical tensions edge towards crossing Tokyo's red lines or an accident leads to a kinetic incident.

Overview of The Indian and Pacific Oceans in Japan's Maritime Defence Strategy

Deeply dependent on open, secure sea lanes of communication (SLOCs), Japan's maritime defence strategy in the Indian and Pacific Oceans has focused on unrestricted access to SLOCs stretching from the Bashi channel, through Taiwan, the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf and into the Mediterranean. A perennial interest, these maritime arteries ferry critical energy resources from the Middle East to Japan to fuel its economy, imports, and exports.

During the Cold War, Japan worked with the U.S. to secure SLOCs within a broader strategy to hem in the Soviet Union. Upon completing the 1978 negotiations of the Japan-U.S. alliance guidelines²¹, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki committed Japan to defend SLOCs up to 100 nautical miles from Japan²².

This approach was premised on the U.S. shouldering the large share of the maritime security burden and the reality of Japan's post-WW-II constitution, particularly Article 9, which forbade Japan from using military force to exercise foreign policy.

²¹ Ministry of Defence (MOD), *The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation* (November 27, 1978), 2021, https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/ampo/19781127.html (accessed: 14.12.2021).

²² D. Oderdorfer, *Suzuki Pledges Greater Effort in Pacific Defence*, "The Washington Post", 9.05.1981, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/05/09/suzuki-pledges-greater-effort-in-pacific-defense/44669c6a-03d8-43d5-967f-0d8bd364ffa0/?utm_term=.717c04f6fb44 (accessed: 14.12.2021).

ARTICLE 9

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised.

Article 9 restricted Japan's ability to secure its maritime interests in the post-WW-II period using the traditional and arguably commonplace levers of national power, most notably military power.

Bradford (2018) provides a more functional division of Japan's maritime strategy in the Pacific and Indian Oceans through his division into three distinct phases focusing on Southeast Asia, arguably the most critical aspect of Japan's maritime strategy²³. The first phase of Japan's maritime strategy was from 1969–1998, the second phase was 1999–2009, and the third phase was from 2010 to the present. The first phase was characterised by navigational safety, the second expanded its operations to include civilian maritime law enforcement capabilities, and the present-day operations have seen the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) supporting a regional constabulary capacity.

The focus on Southeast Asia as the ligature connecting the Pacific and the Indian Oceans was intentional. While a centre of non-traditional security challenges from piracy to illegal fishing, the increased prominence of territorial disputes in the South China Sea has led Japanese strategic thinkers to consider the repercussions of increased

²³ J.F. Bradford, *Understanding Fifty Years of Japanese Maritime Security Capacity Building Activities in Southeast Asia*, National Institute of Defence Studies, 5.09.2018, <http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/backnumber/pdf/20180905.pdf> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

claimant friction on commerce²⁴. Any disruption in SLOCs would bring the Japanese economy to its knees²⁵.

While tactics to secure SLOC have continued to evolve, Japan's maritime defence strategy in the Indian and Pacific Oceans continues to be focused on unrestricted access to SLOCs.

Evolution of Japanese Maritime Strategy After the Cold War

The evolution of Japanese maritime strategy in the Indo-Pacific in the post-Cold War period to approximately 2012 witnessed both continuity and incremental change. In the case of the former, Japan saw the benefits of ODA and resource diplomacy 資源外交/ shigen gaikou as successes that needed to be continued²⁶. In the case of the latter, incremental change was very much stirred by the geopolitical seismic changes that emerged with new security realities manifesting in the wake of the collapse of the U.S.S.R., forcing Japan to again recalibrate its tactical approaches to achieve its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific.

The end of the Cold War resulted in the disentanglement of many unnatural partnerships used to contain the U.S.S.R. First and foremost was the partnership between the US, Japan, South Korea, China, and other states in East Asia. As the *raison d'être* of the partnership evaporated, states in Northeast Asia began to turn their security lens to their backyard, resurrecting historical, and territorial arguments and concentrating their domestic and diplomatic efforts on

²⁴ K. Jimbo, *Japan Should Build ASEAN's Security Capacity*, "AJISS Commentary", 30.05.2012, <https://npi.or.jp/en/research/2012/05/30182837.html> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

²⁵ E. Graham, *Japan's Sea Lane Security 1940-2004: A Matter of Life or Death?*, Routledge, New York 2006, pp. 8–31; R. Yamamoto, *The Securitization of Japan's ODA*, in: A. Asplund, M. Soderberg (eds.), *Japanese Development Cooperation*, Routledge, New York 2016, p. 75.

²⁶ M.H. Moni, *Book Review of: The Political Economy of Japanese Trade Policy*, "Economic and Political Studies" 2019, Vol. 7, pp. 106–112.

nation-building, securing core interests and reunification in the case of the Korean Peninsula.

The collapse of the U.S.S.R. meant the US would need to reconfigure its global military footprint to reflect that it was no longer one of the two main competitors in the bipolar world. It meant decreasing military footprints and budgets, reallocating, repositioning, and rationalising military deployments, and demanding more burden-sharing from allies and security partners globally but in particular in East Asia, as outlined in the 1993 Report on the Bottom-up Review by then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin²⁷.

The 1995 report entitled "Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region" by Joseph Nye further argued that the U.S.'s priorities should be focused on the Asia-Pacific and that the U.S. should prioritise the U.S.-Japan alliance as "there is no more important bilateral relationship than the one we have with Japan" and calling it "fundamental to both our Pacific security policy and our global strategic objectives"²⁸.

At the same time, with China turning its sights to the Senkaku islands in the East China Sea (ECS), cross-straits relations and its territorial claims in the SCS, Japan slowly began to recognise that ODA and resource diplomacy were no longer sufficient to secure its maritime interests, SLOCs and how to secure them returned to the fore among maritime security planners in Tokyo.

Other factors also compelled policymakers to rethink their region's security risks and how to respond. The Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989, China's nuclear tests in 1994 and growing anti-Japanese propaganda led policymakers to rethink whether or not Sino-Japanese relations were moving in a positive direction and what impact

²⁷ L. Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, October 1993, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA359953.pdf> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

²⁸ Department of Defence (DOD), *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, February 1995, <https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/JPUS/19950227.O1E.html> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

a negative spiral would have on Japan. These concerns deepened following anti-Japanese riots in the Mainland in the early 2000s, 2010 and 2012²⁹.

Developments on the Korean Peninsula also contributed to Japan's maritime security in the Indo-Pacific strategy. Specifically, launches of the Taepodong long-range missiles in the mid-1990s raised alarm bells in Tokyo³⁰.

The convergence of demands from the U.S. for Japan to bear more of the costs of its security both in terms of financial contributions and the scope and breadth of its activities that fall under the Japan–U.S. alliance, alongside growing concerns about China and North Korea have caused Japan to adapt to the changing security challenges in the region and accommodate to U.S. demands, resulting in Japan incrementally growing its maritime capacities during this period³¹. For example, during this period, we saw revisions in the Japan–U.S. Alliance guidelines, which have expanded the scope and breadth of Japanese maritime self-defence from the immediate areas surrounding Japan to activities in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea to Asia-Pacific³². The areas of operations have also been expanded to include not only search and rescue but maritime surveillance activities.

Chinese and North Korean activities have prompted maritime strategists to incorporate anti-ballistic missile systems such as THAAD and sea-based AEGIS systems into their planning as well

²⁹ S.R. Nagy, *Territorial Disputes, Trade and Diplomacy: Examining the Repercussions of the Sino-Japanese Territorial Dispute on Bilateral Trade*, "China Perspectives" 2018, No. 4, pp. 46–57.

³⁰ D.A. Pinkston, *The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program*, US Army War College Press, Carlisle 2008.

³¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security-Alliance for the 21st Century*, 17.04.1996, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

³² Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), *The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, 2021, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

as training to take back territories from unnamed assailants through the development of maritime self-defence forces trained in tactics to re-acquire island territories from an occupying force.

While these exogenous factors have been salient parts of Japan's incremental shifts in its maritime strategy in the Indo-Pacific, endogenous forces have also played a hand in the incremental changes that we have witnessed regarding Japan's maritime security Indo-Pacific strategy from the end of the Cold War to 2012.

The endogenous forces that have contributed to Japan's incremental maritime security shift in the Indo-Pacific are rooted in the post-WW-II political divide between conservatives who view Japan's post-WW-II constitution as US-imposed and the pacifists who see the Japanese Constitution as the integral and core value of post-World War II Japan. The former views the Constitution as a reflection of a victor's justice rather than the historical realities behind Japan's wartime period, whereas the other views the Constitution as an ideal that Japan should protect, promote, and embody in its foreign policy.

A combination of factors led to the realisation of an incremental expansion of the scope and breadth of Japan's maritime security in the Indo-Pacific through acquisitions, activities, and the scope of those activities. First, with the shackles of the Cold War removed and assertive if not provocative behaviour by both the Chinese and North Korea, conservatives felt that there was political space to advocate for a more robust and expansive range of military activities for Japan's self-defence forces. Second, these aspirations were in part supported by the U.S. who wanted Japan to contribute more to the alliance in terms of financial support but also more expansive joint activities. Third, the post-Cold War geopolitical environment in Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia was no longer constrained by the strategic priorities of the Cold War, meaning that the tactical truces and cooperation that allowed Japan to rely solely on the three pillars of ODA, resource diplomacy, and the Japan-US alliance were no longer reliable to secure SLOCs.

The result of these changes has been to incrementally broaden the maritime dimension of Japan's Indo-Pacific strategy that is essential for the security of its SLOCs. The major areas of expansion during this period have been the expansion of scope and breadth of activities permitted under the Japan-U.S. alliance guidelines, the acquisition of anti-ballistic missile systems, increased space and submarine surveillance capabilities, and exercises that simulate marine self-defence forces (MSDF) re-acquiring peripheral island territories from an unnamed assailant. Lastly, we have seen Japan expand the quality and quantity of strategic partnerships in Southeast Asia, and with Australia and India to forge partnerships and capacities that align with Japan's maritime strategic priorities³³ (Nagy, 2018). These changes represent the adaptive, accommodative, and innovative side of the Japanese Indo-Pacific strategy. Simply, we are seeing Japan develop capabilities for the Indo-Pacific region that are legally consistent with Article 9 of the Constitution, while these capabilities are intentionally designed so that they can mitigate some of the challenges within the Indo-Pacific region being implemented by revisionist states.

Contemporary Japanese Strategy towards the Indo-Pacific region

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's return to power in December 2012 enabled him to bring to life his Indo-Pacific vision first articulated when he delivered his "Confluence of the Two Seas" speech to the Parliament of the Republic of India in August 2007³⁴. Initially linked to the

³³ S.R. Nagy, *The East Asia Perspective on the Security Partnership with Japan*, in: W. Vosse, P. Midford (eds.), *Japan's New Security Partnerships*, Manchester University Press, Manchester 2018, pp. 112–129.

³⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Confluence of the Two Seas," *Speech by Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India*, 22.08.2007, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

Arc of Freedom and Democracy³⁵, Abe's initial formulation articulated by his then Minister of Foreign Affairs Aso Taro did not receive buy-in from regional stakeholders owing to its normative focus. Consequently, Japan's initial Indo-Pacific vision lost momentum, along with the coolly received Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and Abe stepping down from power.

Lessons learned, upon returning to power, Abe shifted his Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision away from its normative components that focused on human rights and democracy to rule-of-law in the maritime domain of the littoral states of the Indo-Pacific region. While not explicitly targeting China, the focus on a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific was implicitly targeting China in the wake of Beijing's building and militarisation of artificial islands in the SCS, regular incursions into Japan's EEZ associated with the Senkaku Islands, rejection of the Permanent Court of Arbitration's decision in July 2016 against Chinese claims in the SCS, and the 10% year-on-year increase in military budgets in China.

The FOIP seen alongside the Quad raised many questions for stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific. In the 2019 State of Southeast Asia Survey, 17.3% of Southeast Asia states viewed the concept of FOIP as undermining ASEAN centrality, and 25.4% viewed the FOIP as a ploy to contain China³⁶.

Comparing Japan's Diplomatic Blue Books from 2017–2020, we see that Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs incorporated concerns of Indo-Pacific stakeholders into its evolving vision. For example, in

³⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, *“Global Management and the Mission for Japanese Diplomacy”*, Speech by Taro Aso, Foreign Minister of Japan, for The 17th Asia Corporate Conference “Coming Together, Moving Ahead: Asian Economies Leading through Integration and Innovation” (Asia Society; May 16–18, 2007), 18.05.2007, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/address0705.html> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

³⁶ Siew Mun Tang, M. Thuzar, Thi Ha Hoang, T. Chalermpananupap, Thi Phuong Thao Pham, A.Q. Saelaow, *The State of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report*, 2019, p. 25.

the 2017 Diplomatic Blue Book³⁷, the FOIP is articulated as a strategy and stressed that “Japan bears the responsibility of fostering the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and of Asia and Africa into a place that values freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, free from force or coercion, and making it prosperous”. The 2018 Diplomatic Blue Book, in contrast, more explicitly articulates challenges “such as piracy, terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, natural disasters and illegal fishing. Japan is promoting the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” to make the Indo-Pacific region “international public goods” that bring stability and prosperity. This Strategy involves maintaining and strengthening a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law across the region through addressing those challenges, as well as through enhancing connectivity within the region by developing Quality Infrastructure in accordance with international standards”³⁸.

We also see a shift towards non-security related public goods to be provided by Japan and like-minded states to the littoral states of the Indo-Pacific, including: (1) the promotion and establishment of fundamental principles such as the rule of law and freedom of navigation; (2) the pursuit of economic prosperity through enhancing connectivity, including through Quality Infrastructure development following international standards; and (3) initiatives for ensuring peace and stability that include assistance for capacity building on maritime law enforcement, disaster risk reduction and non-proliferation³⁹.

³⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, *Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy*, in: *International Situation and Japan's Diplomacy in 2016, The 2017 Diplomatic Bluebook*, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2017/html/chapter1/c0102.html#sf03> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

³⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, *Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy*, in: *International Situation and Japan's Diplomacy in 2017, The 2018 Diplomatic Bluebook*, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2018/html/chapter1/c0102.html#sf01> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

³⁹ Ibid.

The FOIP vision continued to evolve in subsequent years with the 2019 Diplomatic Blue Book⁴⁰ focusing on: 1) The promotion and solidifying of the rule of law, freedom of navigation, free trade, etc.; 2) The pursuit of economic prosperity through enhancing connectivities, including through quality infrastructure development following international standards; and 3) Commitment for peace and stability that includes assistance for capacity building on maritime law enforcement, cooperation in such fields as disaster risk reduction and non-proliferation.

This evolution of FOIP continued to ensure stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region did not feel that the Indo-Pacific concept undermines ASEAN centrality. To illustrate, Japan's 2020 Diplomatic Bluebook⁴¹ incorporates a special section for ASEAN entitled "ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP): the Indo-Pacific Vision of ASEAN, by ASEAN, for ASEAN".

Hosoya (2019) calls this evolution FOIP 2.0⁴², a recognition by the Japanese government that a security-centred FOIP will not garner support in the region and thus will not be sustainable. The 2020 Diplomatic Bluebook demonstrates Japan's sensitivity to ASEAN as a stakeholder that buys into Japan's version of FOIP.

Other scholars see FOIP through several lenses. Above and beyond seeing FOIP as an effort to inculcate a liberal international order into the Indo-Pacific region, Satake (2020), for instance, sees the

⁴⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Japan, Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy*, in: *International Situation and Japan's Diplomacy in 2018, The 2019 Diplomatic Bluebook*, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2019/html/chapter1/c0102.html#sf01> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

⁴¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Japan, ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP): the Indo-Pacific Vision of ASEAN, by ASEAN, for ASEAN*, in: *Japan's Foreign Policy that Takes a Panoramic Perspective of the World Map 2018, The 2020 Diplomatic Bluebook*, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2020/html/chapter2/c020107.html#sf03> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

⁴² Y. Hosoya, *FOIP 2.0: The Evolution of Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy*, "Asia-Pacific Review" 2019, Vol. 26, No. 1, p. 18–28.

diversity of collaborative relationships being pursued by Japan under the FOIP rubric to be part of an intentional strategy to strengthen cooperation with countries other than the U.S.⁴³.

The commitment to signing a Defence Treaty with Australia⁴⁴, the May 3, 2021 Shared Canada-Japan priorities to a free and open Indo-Pacific region statement⁴⁵, the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative (RSCI)⁴⁶, and Japan joining both the CPTPP and RCEP demonstrate this commitment to diversifying partners throughout the region in various forms of commitments. Importantly, China has not been excluded from this diversification process at the trade level, demonstrating Japan's continued balancing approach with its biggest trading partner.

While diversification of cooperation partners remains a central component of Japan's broader efforts to insinuate itself into the Indo-Pacific region through a multitude of partnerships, this should not be understood as distancing Japan from the U.S.

On the contrary, Japan has been intent on gluing the U.S. into the Indo-Pacific for decades through institutional participation, investing in its alliance, re-enforcing the U.S.-led security architecture in the region, through trade, technology, and most contemporaneously through the FOIP and Quad.

⁴³ T. Satake, *Japan: Initiatives for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific*, "East Asian Strategic Review" 2020, pp. 194–216.

⁴⁴ S. Nagy, *Japan-Australia Defence Treaty: US Allies Adapting to New Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific*, "Geopolitical Monitor", 24.11.2020, <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/japan-australia-defense-treaty-us-allies-adapt-to-new-geopolitics-of-the-indo-pacific> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

⁴⁵ Global Affairs Canada (GaC), *Shared Canada-Japan Priorities Contributing to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region*, 3.05.2021, <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2021/05/shared-canada-japan-priorities-contributing-to-a-free-and-open-indopacific-region.html> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

⁴⁶ Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Australia-India-Japan Economic Ministers' Joint Statement on Supply Chain Resilience*, 1.09.2020, <https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2020/09/20200901008/20200901008-1.pdf> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

At the institutional level, Japan has consistently advocated for the U.S. to be part of the East Asia Summit to balance China's influence within the organisation. On trade, Japan worked hard to realise a TPP with the U.S. and continues to leave the door open to it re-joining after the Trump administration's withdrawal from the mega trade agreement. It also signed a mini trade deal in September 2019 involving market access for certain agriculture and goods, as well as digital trade to strengthen ties⁴⁷.

In terms of the alliance and the U.S.-led regional security architecture, Japan's new National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG) of December 2018 clearly articulate the U.S. as Japan's most comprehensive and indispensable partner⁴⁸. The Guidelines highlight the role of the Japan-U.S. alliance and Japan's commitment to "enhance the Alliance's ability to deter and counter threats, and is a foundation upon which to strategically promote security cooperation in line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific".

What is clear is that even under the unpredictable Trump administration, Japan saw its FOIP vision to be wedded to the Japan-U.S. alliance, its trading relationship with the U.S., and in the hope that the U.S. would rethink and re-join the CPTPP.

Notwithstanding the deepening of the Japan-U.S. alliance and it being a cornerstone to how Japan envisioned its FOIP strategy, the deterioration of U.S.-China relations has also shaped the FOIP's evolution. The U.S.-initiated trade war and potential limitations on foreign direct investment (FDA), foundational technologies and the flow of people with China, raised concern about U.S. policies vis-à-vis China negatively affecting Japan's biggest trading partner. That, in addition

⁴⁷ United States Trade Representative, *Fact Sheet on U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement*, September 2019, <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2019/september/fact-sheet-us-japan-trade-Agreement> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

⁴⁸ Ministry of Defence, *National Defence Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and Beyond*, 18.12.2018, https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/20181218_e.pdf (accessed: 14.12.2021).

to the over-securitised focus of the Trump administration's approach to China and its Indo-Pacific Strategy, led Japan to double down on joining several multilateral trade agreements, including the CPTPP, the Japan-EU EPA, and the RCEP. At the same time, Japan also proactively rebranded its FOIP-related activities to focus on infrastructure and connectivity, digital connectivity, and the economy⁴⁹.

This rebranding of FOIP-related activities resulted in several multilateral initiatives emerging. First, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA), the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), signed an MoU to promote cooperation among Japanese, U.S. and Australian companies in the infrastructure, energy, and natural resources sectors in third countries, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific region, through collaboration in financing⁵⁰.

Second, Japan, the U.S., and India initiated the Blue Dot Network (BDN) at the 35th ASEAN Summit in Thailand. The BDN is an international certificate program that promotes expedited quality infrastructure to low and middle-income countries with a focus on transparency and sustainability⁵¹.

Both initiatives served to anchor the U.S. into the region, to temper the over-securitised U.S. approach to the Indo-Pacific region, and to distinguish Japan's FOIP approach to the region from the U.S. one,

⁴⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, *Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy*, in: *International Situation and Japan's Diplomacy in 2016, The 2017 Diplomatic Bluebook*, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2017/html/chapter1/c0102.html#sf03> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

⁵⁰ The Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), *JBIC Signs MOU with Overseas Private Investment Corporation of the U.S., Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Export Finance and Insurance Corporation of Australia*, 12.11.2018, <https://www.jbic.go.jp/en/information/press/press-2018/1112-011585.html> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

⁵¹ J. Panda, *India, the Blue Dot Network, and the "Quad Plus" Calculus*, "Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs" 2020, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 1–22.

continuing to stress the importance of promoting a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific and stability and peace through development.

Garnering success in promoting infrastructure and connectivity in the region with the U.S. and other partners, Japan's FOIP vision took another turn when the Trump administration began to put pressure on China's Made in China 2025 national development strategy and the Chinese high-tech industry. Here we saw Tokyo include Data Free flow with Trust (DFFT)⁵² and the development of alternatives to 5G⁵³ as pillars of FOIP.

To accomplish this task, at home Japan began to offer tax incentives to incentivise network service providers to invest in secure 5G infrastructure and mitigate supply-chain risk⁵⁴. Overseas and in the Indo-Pacific, Japan used the DFFT initiative to facilitate the synthesising of domestic and international legal frameworks through the use and reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO)⁵⁵. Both efforts aimed to wed the FOIP's principles of "free" and "open" to the digital realm through the emphasis on data privacy, an explicit response to China's promotion of cyber sovereignty through data localisation laws and the National Intelligence Law⁵⁶ that "strengthened the legal basis for China's security activities and requiring Chine-

⁵² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *DFFT: Data Free Flow with Trust*, 7.06.2019, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100167362.pdf> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

⁵³ Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, *Beyond 5G Promoting Strategy (Overview)*, https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/joho_tsusin/eng/presentation/pdf/200414_B5G_ENG_v01.pdf (accessed: 14.12.2021).

⁵⁴ M. Matsubara, *Japan's 5G Approach Sets a Model for Global Cooperation*, "Lawfare", 14.09.2020, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/japans-5g-approach-sets-model-global-cooperation> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

⁵⁵ K. Koga, *Great Disruption: Uncertainty over The Indo-Pacific*, "Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations" 2020, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 137–148.

⁵⁶ Chinese National People's Congress Network, *National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic*, 27.06.2017, https://cs.brown.edu/courses/csc1800/sources/2017_PRC_NationalIntelligenceLaw.pdf (accessed: 14.12.2021).

se and foreign citizens, enterprises, and organisations to cooperate with them”⁵⁷.

The institutionalisation of the Quad has also been an important element of Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision, however not one that is explicitly wedded to the FOIP.

Ryosuke Hanada argues:

“Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe gave birth to the idea of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2007, that was based on incrementally expanded regional cooperation mechanisms, especially the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the development of triangular relations, especially Australia-Japan-US trilateral security cooperation. Both were, in different ways, stimulated by increasing threat perceptions of China based on uncertainties about China's rise. In that sense, the revival of the Quad in 2017 cannot simply be attributed to Shinzo Abe's leadership but also to the fact that four governments carefully and steadily shifted their foreign policy priorities in broader East Asia or the Asia-Pacific and developed bilateral and trilateral security cooperation mechanism since 2007 in the face of a rising and assertive China. Abe recognised these developments and skillfully helped revive the Quad in 2017 with his conceptualisation of the Indo-Pacific regional concept as a pillar of Japanese foreign policy”⁵⁸.

For Japan, the Quad serves many purposes, and its function continues to evolve. First, it serves to further anchor the U.S. into multilateral institutions, although nascent in the region, ensuring that the U.S. is bringing economic, diplomatic, and security resources to the region. Second, the inclusion of India signals to India and other developing states that they are part of the institutional building process of a new institution meant to bring public goods to the region. Third, the Quad provides an additional layer of institutional support to the

⁵⁷ M. Scot Tanner, *Beijing's New National Intelligence Law: From Defence to Offense*, “Lawfare”, 20.07.2017, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/beijings-new-national-intelligence-law-defense-offense> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

⁵⁸ R. Hanada, *The Role of U.S.–Japan–Australia–India Cooperation, or the ‘Quad’ in FOIP: A Policy Coordination Mechanism for a Rules-based Order*, “Strategic Japan Working Papers”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019, <https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

Indo-Pacific to manage the challenges of China's re-emergence as the dominant economy in the region.

This last point is a salient one. The Quad is not an Asian NATO, nor is it meant to replace pre-existing institutions; rather, it is meant as a supplementary multilateral institution intended to contribute to the realisation of the FOIP vision.

Like FOIP, though, the Quad has not been well received by ASEAN members and China in particular. Both view the Quad as aimed at China, and as such, it has little stakeholder buy-in in Southeast Asia⁵⁹.

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's linking the Quad to "countering the challenge that the Chinese Communist Party presents to all of us" and "pushing back against assertive Chinese behaviour in and around the Senkaku Islands, the South China Sea, and along the Indo-Chinese border only strengthens the concerns of Southeast Asian states that the Quad will elevate tensions in the region and place them in the difficult position of choosing between their economic benefactor China and the U.S."⁶⁰

Tokyo, the Biden administration, and the other Quad members recognise this. That is why the March 2021 Quad leaders' summit released a statement that focused on the provision of public goods. Specifically, the Quad Leaders' Joint Statement: "The Spirit of the Quad" focused on 4 areas: 1) supporting a region that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion; 2) promoting a free, open rules-based order, rooted in international law to advance security and prosperity and counter threats to

⁵⁹ P. Saha, *The Quad in the Indo-Pacific: Why ASEAN Remains Cautious*, The Observer Research Foundation (ORF), 26.02.2018, <https://www.orfonline.org/research/asean-quad/> (accessed: 14.12.2021); R. Dermawan, *Is the Quad's Revival a Threat to ASEAN?*, The Diplomat, 18.03.2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/is-the-quads-revival-a-threat-to-asean> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

⁶⁰ S. Nagy, *How to Build a Better 'Quad'*, "The Japan Times", 9.10.2020, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/10/09/commentary/world-commentary/build-better-quad> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond; 3) pledging to respond to the economic and health impacts of COVID-19, combat climate change, and address shared challenges, including in cyberspace, critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure investment, and humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief as well as maritime domains; and 4) joining forces to expand safe, affordable, and effective vaccine production and equitable access, to speed economic recovery and benefit global health⁶¹.

This provision of public goods through the Quad aims to get stakeholder buy-in in Southeast Asia and with other states that cannot afford to be associated with an institution that is explicitly targeted at China.

At the same time, a new formulation of the Quad is emerging, Quad-plus. Here, states such as Canada and France have found ways to participate in maritime exercises or to include Quad members in their own maritime exercises. In the case of the former, in January 2021 Canada participated in the Sea Dragon 21⁶² exercises near Guam. In the case of the latter, Quad members joined France in their La Perouse exercises⁶³ in April 2021.

While not yet institutionalised, Tokyo and other Quad members see the usefulness of a Quad-plus formulation, as Jagannath Panda writes, in “being a vital tool for states in the Indo-Pacific region to further

⁶¹ The White House, *Quad Leaders' Joint Statement: "The Spirit of the Quad"*, 12.03.2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

⁶² CTF 72 Public Affairs, *Sea Dragon 2021 Kicks Off Between US and Partner Nations*, 11.01.2021, <https://www.c7f.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/2468589/guam-hosts-partner-nations-in-exercise-sea-dragon-2021> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

⁶³ K. Parpiani, *La Perouse – Quad Naval Exercise and India's Strategic Partnership with France*, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), 4.04.2021, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/la-perouse-quad-naval-exercise-and-indias-strategic-partnership-with-france> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

their economic and technological goals by providing new avenues for building bridges and opportunities for growth and development”⁶⁴.

The Quad’s relationship to FOIP and Japan’s security will ultimately be linked to China’s behaviour in the region. A more assertive China could push the Quad members closer together to constrain Chinese behaviour through proactive security cooperation and investing in and strengthening the Indo-Pacific littoral states’ development. It could be through Quad-plus arrangements with interested stakeholders, empowering the BDN and alternatives to the Belt and Road Initiative.

A less assertive or more cooperative China, in contrast, may find opportunities to cooperate with the Quad member in a Quad-plus formulation. Climate change mitigation and dealing with non-traditional security challenges such as piracy, illegal fishing and sanction evasion are possible candidates.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 has elevated perennial Japanese concerns about a Sino-Russo alignment⁶⁵. These concerns have led to Tokyo doubling down on its commitment to a rules-based order espoused through the FOIP Vision⁶⁶.

To illustrate, PM Kishida Fumio clearly articulated that commitment to a rules-based order espoused through the FOIP Vision in his June 10, 2022 ISS Shangri-La Dialogue. He stressed the importance of “Maintaining and Strengthening the Rules-based Free and Open International Order; Bringing New Developments towards

⁶⁴ J. Panda, *Quad-Plus: Form Versus Substance*, “The Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs” 2020, Vol. 3, No. 5, pp. 3–16.

⁶⁵ Japan’s House of Representatives, *Resolution Condemning Russia’s Aggression Against Ukraine*, 1.03.2022, https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_english.nsf/html/statics/english/ketugi_e220301-1.htm (accessed: 14.12.2021).

⁶⁶ Sh. Smith, *Japan Doubles Down on Defending the Post-War Order*, The East Asia Forum, 4.09.2022, <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/09/04/japan-doubles-down-on-defending-the-postwar-order> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

a Free and Open Indo-Pacific” and that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow”⁶⁷.

Words have been backed up by concrete policy coordination with the U.S., the E.U. and other likeminded countries and political associations, including military support for Ukrainian forces⁶⁸ and freezing assets held by four more Russians and cooperating with other countries in blocking Russia from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication⁶⁹. We have also seen Japan designate at least 25 individuals related to the Russian Federation subject to the following sanctions: 1) Restriction on payment: A license is required in order to make payment to the designated persons; and 2) Restrictions on capital transactions: A license is required on capital transactions including deposit contracts, trust contracts, money loan contracts, etc. with the designated persons⁷⁰.

Japan's participation in the Madrid NATO Summit in June 2022 alongside Australia, New Zealand and South Korea was significant. Japan and NATO drew a direct link to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the use of force to change the regional order and revanchists sta-

⁶⁷ *Keynote Address by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue*, 10.06.2022, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/statement/202206/_00002.html (accessed: 14.12.2021).

⁶⁸ ウクライナへの装備品等の提供について / *Ukurainaheno zhuāgbei pīn dēgno tigōnitsuite / Provision of Equipment, etc. to Ukraine*, Ministry of Defense, 8.03.2022, <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2022/03/08b.html> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

⁶⁹ *Japan to Freeze Assets of 4 More Russian Banks to Align with EU*, “Kyodo News”, 3.03.2022, <https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2022/03/e2783c3e9bf4-japan-to-freeze-assets-of-4-more-russian-banks-to-keep-pace-with-eu.html> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

⁷⁰ J. Suetomi, *Japan Introduces Further Sanctions Against Russia*, “Sanctions & Export Controls Blog”, 29.03.2022, <https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/japan-introduces-further-sanctions-against-russia> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

tes in the Indo-Pacific such as China attempting to reshape the regional order through force, grey zone or lawfare tactics⁷¹.

We have also seen much more explicit statements about key strategic spaces and issue in the Indo-Pacific, including the position Taiwan occupies in Japan's security calculus. For example, at the Breakfast Meeting with a Delegation Led by U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi hosted by Prime Minister Kishida had both Japanese and U.S. counterparts expressed their intention to continue to work closely together to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait⁷². We have also seen support for the status quo explicitly articulated in joint leader statements between former PM Suga Yoshihide in 2021 and between PM Kishida and Biden in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and concerns about Chinese behaviour towards Taiwan.

In-line with Japan's broader FOIP vision and hybrid approach to foreign policy, Japan continues to invest in "multilayered partnership with allies and likeminded countries that share universal values in the Indo-Pacific region – such as Japan-U.S.-Australia, Japan-U.S.-ROK, NATO+AP4, and AUKUS – have become more active. From the viewpoint of further encouraging such security partnership in the region, Japan signed and has been negotiating the reciprocal access agreements, RAAs, with Australia and the U.K., respectively. Also, Japan is deepening strategic discussions not only with these two countries, but also with the Philippines, Germany, India, Indonesia, and France, through 2+2 ministerial meetings. Furthermore, we will advance defense equipment and technology transfer agreement with ASEAN countries" as outline in Foreign Minister Hay-

⁷¹ Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2022*, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/public/w_paper/wp2022/DOJ2022_Digest_EN.pdf (accessed: 14.12.2021).

⁷² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Breakfast Meeting with a Delegation Led by U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi Hosted by Prime Minister Kishida*, 5.08.2022., https://www.mofa.go.jp/na/na1/us/page3e_001230.html (accessed: 14.12.2021).

ashi Yoshimasa at his speech at the Centre for International Security Studies (CSIS) on August 1, 2022⁷³.

Conclusion: Friend and Frenemy pushing FOIP to evolve

At the outset of this chapter two key questions were raised about FOIP's evolution: 1) What and why have critical junctures pushed FOIP to evolve; and 2) Are these changes being institutionalised? This chapter found that the core tenets of FOIP are grounded in Japan's need to have unobstructed, stable, and rules-based governance to protect SLOCs in the Indo-Pacific. Critical junctures that have compelled Japan to alter its FOIP vision have not exclusively come from the challenges emerging in the region, such as North Korea's weapons proliferation and China's assertive behaviour. The U.S., especially the Trump administration's approach to international relations and China, has compelled Japan to adapt its FOIP vision to accommodate the tensions emerging from the deteriorating U.S.-China relationship. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has further re-enforced Japan's FOIP approach and the overall trends that Japan understands shaping the Indo-Pacific in the coming years⁷⁴.

Today's FOIP vision is a broad framework that aims to create a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific by: 1) a selective accommodation of China's rise; 2) deeply integrating Japan into the Indo-Pacific politico-economy and rules-making process; 3) tightening the Japan-U.S.

⁷³ Y. Hayashi, *Japan's Vision for a Free, Open and Inclusive International Order Based on the Rule of Law*, Centre for International Security Studies (CSIS), 1.08.2022, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/japans-vision-free-open-and-inclusive-international-order-based-rule-law> (accessed: 14.12.2021).

⁷⁴ M. Iishi, *The Lessons of the Ukraine War for the Indo-Pacific Region: A Preview of, Rather Than a Change in, What We Will Face in 10–15 Years*, "AJISS-Commentary", 31.08.2022, https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/ajiss_commentary/the-lessons-of-the-ukraine-war-for-the-indo-pacific-region.html (accessed: 14.12.2021).

alliance and cementing the U.S. into the region; and 4) diversifying and deepening its strategic partnerships.

Cooperation under the FOIP umbrella continues to be institutionalised, as evidenced by the BDN, the RSCI, the Quad, infrastructure and connectivity cooperation in third countries, and Japan's participation in multilateral FTAs that are not exclusive of China.

The chapter's findings suggest that Japan's approach to the Indo-Pacific neither follows the logic of neorealism or liberal institutionalism; rather, Japan takes a hybrid approach of hedging and engagement to secure its Indo-Pacific interests.

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