Diplomatic drift has sidelined Tokyo in an era of great power competition
The absence was conspicuous. Last week, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, while Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney commanded the stage with his vision for rebuilding international economic cooperation, Japanese representation was perfunctory — a few corporate executives, a junior minister, no commanding presence.
This was no one-off. In late October, when South Korea hosted the 2025 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, the dramatic bilateral meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping overshadowed Tokyo’s delegation, reducing Japan to a spectator as the world’s two largest economies negotiated over the region’s future.
And at the Group of Seven summit in Canada last June, Japan’s then-prime minister, Shigeru Ishiba, appeared peripheral at best — his timidness and limited English preventing him from inserting Japan into deliberations while European leaders grappled with Ukraine and Trump focused on bilateral arrangements.
This diplomatic fade represents more than a temporary slump. Japan is experiencing a crisis of international relevance at precisely the moment when the rules-based order it helped build is fracturing. The question facing Sanae Takaichi — or whoever succeeds to the prime ministership following the Feb. 8 snap election — is whether Japan can reverse this decline.
The roots of Japan’s predicament lie in a failure of diplomatic imagination and personal chemistry. Prime Minister Ishiba, despite his expertise in defense matters, never established rapport with foreign leaders. His discomfort with English-language settings — so different from the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s facility in international forums — meant Japan’s voice was muted when it needed amplification. The Trump administration, focused on bilateral deal-making with Beijing, found little utility in Tokyo’s consensus-building approach. Beijing, meanwhile, appeared to have charmed Japanese policymakers into excessive accommodation.
Former Japanese Ambassador to Australia Shingo Yamagami warned about this phenomenon in his July 2024 essay “Beware mesmerisation by China’s spell” in The Strategist. He described “China magic” — the tendency of Japan and Australia to become “absorbed by this magical power and obsessed with making efforts not to displease their Chinese counterparts.” As Yamagami cautioned, “Beijing will exploit this excessive enthusiasm for good relations,” as seen with the recent visit of Prime Minister Carney of Canada. The evidence suggests Japan fell prey to exactly this dynamic.
Nobukatsu Kanehara, former deputy secretary-general of Japan’s National Security Secretariat, framed the challenge starkly at the Ritsumeikan Asia-Pacific University’s 2024 Regional Conference in an address titled “Japan’s Path in a Turbulent Global Landscape.” Japan is navigating “declining national power” amid “the current geopolitical crises,” Kanehara explained. With the United States “no longer holding the influence it once had,” Japan, as “the largest allied nation in Asia, bears significant responsibility.” Yet that responsibility went unfulfilled during the Ishiba government.
Japan’s marginalization also reflects deeper structural shifts. Hiroyuki Akita, commentator for the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, argues in a white paper titled “How Has Japan’s Domestic Political Mood Swayed Its Foreign and National Security Policy?” that Japan functions as an “adaptive state” — one that “takes the blows from external forces and creates and implements policy in the process of adapting.” This has been Japan’s strategic DNA since the Meiji Restoration, alternating between brilliant adaptation and catastrophic miscalculation.
The current external shock is formidable. The world has entered what former Rep. Yasuhide Nakayama called in a recent blog post a “heated cold war” — where “Russia, China, Iran and North Korea essentially collaborate” to form “an updated version of the ‘Eastern Bloc.’” Nakayama emphasized that developments in “Ukraine, Greenland, Venezuela and the Taiwan Strait are all happening along the same strategic line.” Japan’s traditional quiet diplomacy has proven inadequate.
A Japan Economic Foundation (JEF) report, “Policy Recommendations for Rebuilding the International Order,” stated bluntly: “The international community is a decentralized one. Since there are no fools who will kill each other forever, in the end people instinctively seek stability and peace by managing power relations.” Japan has failed to manage those relations effectively.
The Trump administration’s 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy, made public last week, prioritized the Western Hemisphere and saw allies through the lens of “burden-sharing” — valuing partners mainly for military contributions. Japan barely registers as a diplomatic actor; it appears mainly as geography, part of the “First Island Chain” denial defense. This represents a remarkable diminishment for America’s most important Asian ally.
The contrast with former Prime Minister Abe’s tenure could not be starker. Abe understood that Japan’s security required constant, energetic diplomacy. He traveled relentlessly, cultivating relationships across ideological divides and promoting Japanese soft power through cultural diplomacy and development assistance.
As Akita documents, Abe “had 14 meetings with President Trump during his term.” His “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept showed Japan’s potential intellectual leadership, evolving to become “a keyword in the strategies of the key powers,” with France and other EU members developing their own Indo-Pacific strategies. Japan under Abe actively shaped the international environment rather than merely adapting.
Abe recognized Japan’s unique position as an “adapter middle power” — capable of connecting states at different development levels and bridging political systems. Similarly, a JEF roundtable emphasizes that Japan “is the only country that can serve as a bridge between developed countries and the Global South” given its unique historical experience.
For Takaichi or any future prime minister, reversing decline requires action across three dimensions. First, Japan must increase its presence at multilateral forums, with prime ministerial attendance and initiatives at every major summit. As Kanehara urged, Japan must overcome “domestic divisions” and develop “a pragmatic, realistic national strategy.”
Second, Tokyo must reinvigorate development diplomacy by increasing Official Development Assistance strategically. The JEF recommendations suggest leveraging the Tokyo International Conference on African Development’s 30-year history and deepening integration with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, warning that “the time left for Japan to send a signal that it wants to build a stronger relationship with Southeast Asia” is approximately “3 to 10 years” before generational change erodes remaining advantages.
Third, Japan must cultivate leaders who speak distinctively on artificial intelligence governance, climate adaptation and institutional reform. The JEF report identifies “an urgent need to strategically develop human resources in Japan who not only have language skills, but also the creativity for new large-scale ideas.”
The international order serving Japan’s interests for seven decades is fragmenting. As Nakayama writes, citizens must develop “security literacy” to understand that “the world is already in a period of structural conflict.” China continues its military buildup while cultivating what the National Endowment for Democracy’s “Sharp Power” report terms “manipulative” influence.
Japan cannot afford invisibility. The nation must defend freedom, democracy and rule of law — not as American vassals but as an independent voice. Abe understood this. His successors must learn before Japan’s moment passes. The world is being remade. Japan must shape it — or be shaped by forces hostile to its values.
nagystephen.com 
Leave a comment