Executive Summary

The Indo-Pacific region is experiencing a fundamental shift from broad multilateral cooperation to targeted minilateral partnerships that are small, issue-specific coalitions like the Quad and AUKUS. This transition, driven by US-China competition, multilateral gridlock, and complex transnational challenges, presents both opportunities and risks for regional states.

Minilateralism enables middle powers to enhance strategic influence through niche diplomacy, leverage specialized capabilities, and shape regional security architecture. States can amplify their voice on critical issues while maintaining greater policy autonomy than in large multilateral forums.

Nations face difficult choices navigating US-China rivalry, risk economic fragmentation, strain limited diplomatic resources, and must balance sovereignty concerns with cooperative commitments.

Strategic Recommendations:

• Selective Engagement: Prioritize minilateral partnerships aligned with core national interests and demonstrable outcomes
• Capability Development: Invest in niche strengths (e.g., critical minerals, maritime security, green technology) to become indispensable partners
• Proactive Coalition Building: Lead initiatives addressing regional gaps rather than merely joining others’ frameworks
• Economic Hedging: Participate in supply chain resilience efforts while maintaining open trade principles
• Institutional Balance: Ensure minilateral activities complement rather than undermine existing regional architectures like ASEAN

Hence, success requires sophisticated diplomatic capacity, clear strategic objectives, and careful management of great power dynamics while fostering domestic resilience against external pressures.

The Rise of Minilateralism

Minilateralism’s ascendance signifies not a wholesale rejection of multilateralism, but a pragmatic adaptation to its perceived limitations within a rapidly evolving and increasingly contested global environment. Several interconnected forces fuel this shift.

First, intensifying great power competition between the US and China, is fundamentally reshaping the geopolitical landscape. This competition fosters fragmentation, compelling states to form selective, interest-based coalitions that can respond more decisively than larger, consensus-bound forums. Initiatives like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad – US, Japan, Australia, India) and AUKUS (Australia, UK, US) exemplify this dynamic, offering frameworks perceived as more efficient and less susceptible to obstruction by rivals.

Second, chronic gridlock in multilateral institutions further incentivizes this trend. Key bodies like the UnitedNations Security Council (UNSC), paralyzed by veto politics, and the World Trade Organization (WTO), struggling with consensus-based decision-making, often fail to deliver timely or effective responses to pressing global crises. This institutional paralysis erodes trust and drives states towards alternative, more nimble avenues for cooperation where progress seems attainable.

Third, the overwhelming complexity of 21st-century challenges demands specialized expertise and rapid, flexible responses. Issues like climate change, pandemics, cybersecurity threats, disruptive technologies, and supply chain vulnerabilities transcend borders and require tailored solutions. Minilateral formats, focused on specific issues and comprised of relevant stakeholders with aligned interests and capabilities, offer greater agility and efficiency compared to the often-cumbersome processes of universal multilateral bodies.

Fourth, a renewed emphasis on national sovereignty typified by America First, but amplified by nationalist and populist currents globally, reinforces the appeal of minilateralism. States are increasingly wary of ceding significant decision-making authority to large multilateral entities such as the UN or EU as they are increasingly seen as not-representative of ordinary citizens, undemocratic and in some cases promoters of a global elite agenda instead of the bread-and-butter issues of main street. Minilateral arrangements allow participants to retain greater control over their foreign policy choices and pursue perceived national interests more directly within smaller, more manageable groups, balancing cooperation with autonomy.

In the context of a shift away from multilateralism, the primary but reluctant promoter of multilateralism in the post WW-2 period, the US, has accelerated the shift away from support for multilateralism as it aims to marshal resources and reshape its economy and much of the world away from the post WW-2 economic model and international order that facilitated the rise of authoritarian challengers such as China.

Implications for Key Indo-Pacific States

The shift towards minilateralism presents a complex mix of strategic opportunities and distinct challenges for the diverse nations of India, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. Opportunities for strategic influence and “Niche Diplomacy” first coined by Gareth Evans, former Australian Foreign Minister, in the 1990s and later elaborated by Andrew Cooper are significant.

Minilateralism offers avenues to enhance national standing and impact beyond what might be achievable solely through larger forums or individual action. For instance, India gains a crucial platform like the Quad to shape Indo-Pacific security architecture and assert its role as a major power.

Japan and South Korea can leverage minilateral tech alliances to secure critical supply chains and influence technological standards. The Philippines can utilize maritime security minilaterals to bolster its position in the South China Sea (SCS) disputes. Australia and New Zealand can drive regional climate resilience initiatives through targeted partnerships. Canada can amplify its voice on Arctic security or democratic resilience through focused coalitions.

In the Trump 2.0 world, this translates into being an asset to the US not a liability or burden.

Smaller or middle powers, in particular, find value in leveraging specific strengths. For example, Australia and Canada in resources and energy security, New Zealand in sustainable agriculture and diplomacy, South Korea in advanced manufacturing. These allow them to become indispensable partners within issue-specific minilateral groups.

However, this landscape also presents complex strategic balancing challenges. Navigating the intense US-China rivalry remains the paramount strategic dilemma. Participation in US-led minilaterals (like the Quad) risks provoking significant economic or diplomatic repercussions from Beijing, a vital trading partner for nearly all these nations.

Conversely, abstaining could lead to marginalization in crucial security or economic arrangements and potentially weaken deterrence. Each nation must constantly calibrate its engagement. For example, India fiercely guards its strategic autonomy; Japan and South Korea balance security ties with the US against deep economic interdependence with China; Australia navigates the economic consequences of its security posture; the Philippines faces direct pressure in the South China Sea; New Zealand and Canada seek to maintain constructive relations with both giants while upholding their values.

Furthermore, sovereignty and autonomy concerns persist. Engaging in minilateral commitments, especially those involving security or economic integration, inevitably involves some level of policy coordination and potential compromise. Nations must vigilantly assess whether participation enhances or constrains their freedom of action and decision-making autonomy. The Philippines, for example, must weigh the benefits of enhanced maritime security cooperation against potential perceptions of encroachment on sovereignty.

For small and middle powers, economic fragmentation risks loom large. Minilateral initiatives focused on trade, technology standards, or supply chain resilience can inadvertently fracture the global economic system. This poses challenges for highly trade-dependent economies like Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. They face the difficult task of engaging in necessary resilience-building minilaterals while simultaneously advocating for open, inclusive, rules-based global trade to prevent harmful economic blocs.

Resource constraints and diplomatic overstretch are also real concerns. Actively participating in multiple minilateral initiatives demands significant diplomatic bandwidth, specialized expertise, and financial resources. Smaller foreign services, like those of New Zealand, the Philippines, or even Canada relative to its global interests, risk being stretched thin, potentially diluting their effectiveness across all engagements, multilateral and minilateral alike.

In colloquial terms, whether you are spreading peanut butter, Vegemite, Miso paste or the Indian equivalent, spreading your limited resources too thin leaves you without sustainable and meaningful capacities and capabilities being deployed.

Policy Roadmap for Strategic Engagement for the Indo-Pacific

To be clear, there is no panacea to effectively navigate the minilateral shift and harness its potential. Notwithstanding, Indo-Pacific stakeholders should adopt a proactive and nuanced strategy centered on the following pillars.

States must employ strategic selectiveness and have clear objectives. Engagement must be highly selective and purpose-driven. Each nation should meticulously evaluate potential minilateral partnerships against core national interests.

Key questions to be raised include: Does it address a critical security threat (e.g., maritime security for Japan, Philippines, India)?; Does it enhance vital economic resilience (supply chains for Japan, SK; resources for Australia, Canada)?; Does it advance key values (democracy, rules-based order)?; and Does it leverage unique national strengths?

Clear criteria should be established such as alignment with strategic goals, feasibility of achieving concrete outcomes, composition of partners, resource requirements, and potential sovereignty impacts. Avoid joining initiatives simply for symbolic presence; focus on those where tangible results are achievable and national contribution is meaningful. India’s focused Quad participation, centered on maritime security and regional infrastructure, exemplifies this approach.

Small and middle-sized states must invest in niche capabilities and value proposition. To be sought-after partners and maximize influence within minilaterals, nations must cultivate specialized, high-value capabilities. This requires sustained investment in research, development, and deployment in areas of comparative advantage or strategic priority. Potential niches will depend on the country but in the areas of green technology and climate resilience, Australia has a role with critical minerals, hydrogen; New Zealand in sustainable agritech; South Korea with batteries and renewable tech, and Canada in the areas of clean tech and carbon capture.

In the niche areas of advanced technology and cybersecurity, Japan excels with robotics and AI ethics, South Korea with semiconductors and 6G, India with IT services and digital public infrastructure, Canada in AI and quantum research.

Maritime security and domain awareness are areas of convergence for Japan, India, Australia and the Philippines in enhancing patrol capabilities and information fusion. Supply chain resilience has numerous potential niche partners including Japan, South Korea in the areas of semiconductors and electronics, and Australia and Canada in the area of critical minerals. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) is another area where Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Japan can exert regional response leadership. Excelling in specific domains ensures indispensability within relevant minilateral groups.

To achieve these objectives, middle power minilaterals need proactive coalition building and Agenda Setting. Rather than solely reacting to initiatives led by others, these nations should proactively shape the minilateral landscape. This involves identifying critical gaps or shared challenges within their regions or areas of expertise and convening relevant partners.

Examples include: Australia/New Zealand/Japan leading a Pacific Islands climate adaptation and resilience partnership; India/Japan/Australia driving infrastructure development minilaterals under the Quad umbrella; Canada/Japan/South Korea forming a minilateral on critical mineral supply chain security and processing; Philippines/Vietnam/Indonesia (potentially with US, Japan, Australia support) enhancing coordinated maritime domain awareness in the South China Sea. Setting the agenda allows nations to frame issues according to their interests and values.

They also need to strengthen regional institutional frameworks. For example, minilateralism should complement, not undermine, existing regional multilateral structures like ASEAN, the East Asia Summit (EAS), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). These nations should actively support efforts to enhance the effectiveness and relevance of these bodies.

Minilateral initiatives can serve as “pathfinders” or “building blocks,” testing solutions and generating momentum that can later be scaled up to broader regional or multilateral forums. Engaging transparently with ASEAN centrality, for instance, is crucial for Indo-Pacific minilaterals involving external partners like the Quad members. Ensuring that minilateral outcomes feed into and reinforce the regional multilateral architecture is key to preventing fragmentation.

As part of realizing effective minilateral cooperation, middle powers need to safeguard economic openness and resilience. This will require engaging in necessary minilateral efforts to secure critical supply chains (chips, minerals, pharmaceuticals) and develop trusted technology standards, these nations must simultaneously champion the principles of open, rules-based trade at the global level, particularly within the WTO.

They should work to ensure that resilient minilaterals are designed to be inclusive and non-discriminatory, where possible, avoiding unnecessary barriers. Diversifying trade relationships and investing in domestic economic resilience are also crucial to mitigate the risks of economic coercion or over-reliance on any single market.

Middle powers will also need to enhance diplomatic capacity and coordination. Effective minilateral engagement demands specialized diplomatic skills. Governments must invest in training diplomats in the unique dynamics of small-group negotiations, coalition management, and specialized technical areas (tech governance, climate finance, maritime law).

Establishing dedicated units or task forces focused on key minilateral priorities can enhance coordination and expertise. Streamlining inter-agency coordination domestically is equally vital to ensure coherent national positions across different minilateral forums. Canada’s focus on “coalition diplomacy” and New Zealand’s emphasis on niche expertise offer models.

Despite the risk of other middle powers defecting based on the logic of the prisoner’s dilemma, minilateral coalitions need to protect sovereignty, and strategic autonomy by managing great power dynamics. Engagement strategies must explicitly incorporate mechanisms to safeguard national autonomy. This includes rigorous assessment of commitments, maintaining diversified partnerships to avoid over-dependence, clear red lines regarding core interests, and robust domestic decision-making processes.

Managing the US-China rivalry requires constant, sophisticated calibration: communicating positions clearly to both powers, seeking areas of functional cooperation where interests align (e.g., climate, non-proliferation), diversifying economic ties, investing in deterrence capabilities where necessary, and building resilience against coercion. Transparency with domestic audiences about the rationale and limits of minilateral engagement is crucial for maintaining public support.

Finally, fostering societal resilience is important for middle powers as they navigate minilateral partnerships. The competitive international environment underlying minilateralism heightens vulnerabilities to disinformation, cyberattacks, foreign interference, and economic pressure. Nations must invest in comprehensive societal resilience: bolstering cybersecurity defenses across government and critical infrastructure; promoting critical media literacy and supporting independent journalism; safeguarding democratic institutions and processes; enhancing economic preparedness for potential shocks or coercion; and fostering public understanding of international affairs and the rationale behind foreign policy choices, including minilateral engagement.

Conclusion

The transition towards minilateralism represents a fundamental recalibration of international cooperation, driven by structural shifts in power, institutional efficacy, and the nature of global challenges.

For India, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, this is not merely an abstract trend but a defining feature of their strategic environment. Success hinges on moving beyond passive reaction to proactive, strategic adaptation.

By embracing rigorous selectivity in partnerships, investing decisively in unique capabilities, proactively shaping minilateral agendas, reinforcing regional multilateralism, safeguarding economic openness while building resilience, strengthening diplomatic tools, diligently protecting sovereignty amidst great power rivalry, and fostering societal resilience, these nations can navigate this complex landscape effectively.

The goal is not to replace multilateralism, but to leverage minilateralism as a pragmatic tool to advance vital national and shared regional interests, uphold key principles of the rules-based international order, and enhance their collective agency and influence in an increasingly contested world. Their collective ability to master this minilateral moment will significantly shape the stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

This analysis was first published on September 11, 2025, at Chintan Research Publication.