Shigeru Ishiba’s tenure as prime minister thus far has been marked by foreign policy fumbles, verbal gaffes and problematic shifts away from the consensus that was forged under former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

Abe built a consensus based on protecting a free and open Indo-Pacific and through a delicate balance of engagement, resilience and deterrence toward Japan’s largest trading partner and rival, China. This approach was based on strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance, diversifying security and strategic partners, investing in the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and strengthening relations with India.

It also acknowledged that ensuring Taiwan’s security was an important public good in the region and that Japan’s security would be directly affected by any crisis involving Taiwan — specifically, China using military force to unify with the island.

Ishiba has upended much of that consensus.

Prior to becoming the prime minister, Ishiba floated the idea of an Asian version of NATO. It reflected his view that a collective defense arrangement like NATO would help deter China’s aggressive adventurism and manage the security challenges facing Japan and the region. It was roundly admonished, with even Washington declining to comment. The Indo-Pacific is too diverse for an Asian NATO to become a reality. Additionally, China would use its economic leverage over regional partners to prevent any attempts at forming such a security bloc before it even got off the ground.

Most problematic for Japan under Ishiba has been his inability to secure a meeting with U.S. President-elect Donald Trump. Even the outgoing prime minister of the “51st U.S. state,” (Trump’s words) Canada’s Justin Trudeau, was able to meet Trump at the Mar-a-Lago resort soon after his commanding electoral victory.

More perplexingly, Ishiba chose to skip an invitation to meet the president-elect this month. Yet, Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Hungary’s leader Viktor Orban and Akie Abe, the widow of Shinzo Abe, have all met with the incoming U.S. president.

Every year, Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook highlights that the Japan-U.S. alliance is the cornerstone of the nation’s security. Consecutive Japanese leaders have all echoed their unwavering support for the alliance and the deepening relationship between the allies. Why was Ishiba unable to secure a visit with its most important partner?

The prime minister’s foreign policy fumbles were also evident in the rejection of Nippon Steel’s attempt to purchase U.S. Steel. Where was Ishiba during the lobbying efforts to make the deal a reality? U.S. President Joe Biden declared that Nippon Steel’s acquisition of U.S. Steel posed a national security threat.

Yet, the U.S. gave the recent go-ahead for Japan to purchase advanced American medium-range air-to-air missiles and other related equipment reportedly costing around $3.64 billion. If Japan were truly a national security threat, why would the Biden administration approve the sale of sophisticated missile systems?

If the previous missteps related to Japan’s most important bilateral relationship and decades-long alliance weren’t bad enough, the visit by Ishiba’s foreign minister, Takeshi Iwaya, to Beijing on Dec. 25 to meet Wang Yi, China’s state councilor and minister of foreign affairs, raised concerns about Chinese influence within his government.

As opposed to the expected boilerplate statements that are typical of meetings between Tokyo and Beijing that stress building constructive and stable bilateral relations, the two foreign ministers reached a 10-point consensus at the second meeting of the Japan-China High-Level People-to-People and Cultural Exchange Dialogue.

The two sides agreed on the importance of promoting youth exchange visits, supporting studies and tours between the two countries, deepening cooperation in education and enhancing exchange and cooperation between media outlets and think tanks.

Absent from the consensus was any mention of China Coast Guard and other vessels entering the waters around the Senkaku Islands and Japan’s Yonaguni Island, China’s decades-long military buildup, its indirect support for Russia’s war in Ukraine, its history of economic coercion against Japan, recent killings of Japanese nationals in China and the practice of hostage diplomacy, where Japanese businessmen and scholars are arrested on national security grounds.

What’s more, Iwaya, in an interview in China during his visit, voiced his view that “Chinese civilization is a great Asian civilization. We learned everything from there, including kanji, administrative systems and religion, and this country of Japan was created.” His comments drew the ire not only from the right but also from the left in Japan, both condemning him and the Ishiba administration for not recognizing the nation’s own culture and history, as well as Japan’s crucial role in the modernization of China.

Seen alongside the issuing of a 10-year visa for eligible Chinese citizens and talk of a state visit to Japan for Xi Jinping, there are many questions as to what is driving Ishiba’s foreign policy toward China?

In principle, expanding opportunities for all citizens, including Chinese, is beneficial for the economy and mutual understanding. However, in China’s case, it can present security and immigration risks. How many of those “tourists” might be part of the Ministry of State Security’s extensive intelligence-gathering operations? Will China’s newly adopted National Security Legislation be used to pressure citizens into intelligence gathering or other nefarious activities?

The same can be said for a state visit when it is used to strengthen diplomatic relations with trusted partners who have a proven track record of good behavior.

In the case of Xi’s China, however, the logic is unclear. China is intent on pushing the U.S. out of the region, creating dependent economic relationships with its neighbors (as stated by Xi), reshaping the region’s security architecture and pursuing control over Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea. It supports Russia’s war on Ukraine, offers little help regarding North Korea and generally opposes the rules-based order on which Japan’s prosperity relies.

What exactly is in Japan’s interest here? Why would you offer a state visit? All political leaders experience missteps in their foreign policy pursuits, including Ishiba. But one mistake is an error; two or more is a track record.

Ishiba has yet to establish strong, lasting relations with the U.S. at both the leadership and institutional levels and has not formed a functional yet cautiously balanced relationship with Japan’s largest economic partner. Without American support, Japan remains vulnerable to a revisionist power next door determined to reduce U.S. influence in the region and reshape the global order, where power, not rules, becomes the final arbitrator of international relations.

Without the Asian giant that is China, Japan has no sustainable economic future. The price of that future though should not come at the cost of Japan’s security, political freedom and economic dependence.

This article was first published on January 8, 2025, at The Japan Times.