Tokyo’s friends should champion its forward-looking approach to history
As the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II approaches, allies and friends of Japan face a critical decision. Predictable calls for renewed Japanese apologies will emerge from Beijing, Seoul and domestic activists stressing Japan’s pacifist identity. But supporting such demands would constitute a strategic error that undermines stability in the Indo-Pacific and empowers authoritarian narratives at odds with the interests of Japan, the U.S. and their allies.
Japan’s transformation since 1945 represents one of history’s most successful democratic transitions. From authoritarian empire to liberal democracy, from aggressor to peace advocate, from closed society to open market, Japan’s evolution stands unparalleled among former Axis powers. Today’s Japan bears no institutional, ideological or structural resemblance to its wartime predecessor. This fundamental transformation must inform contemporary policy decisions.
Importantly, Japan’s postwar identity, behavior and contributions to peace and prosperity around the world need to be highlighted by the Japanese government and its allies to counter the politically motivated narratives that paint Japan as an unrepentant and quickly militarizing country that hasn’t learned from its violent imperial period.
Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 2015 statement, and the accompanying Report of the Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century and on Japan’s Role and the World Order in the 21st Century, put forth a definitive position on wartime responsibility. These documents acknowledged historical aggression, expressed remorse and established that perpetual apology cannot be inherited by generations bearing no responsibility for past actions.
The strategic implications are clear. Japan has maintained an unblemished peace record for eight decades that includes no foreign military interventions, no territorial expansions and no aggressive actions against neighbors. Compare this to other regional powers: China has engaged in conflicts with India (1962), the Soviet Union (1969) and Vietnam (1979), while maintaining territorial disputes with 14 neighbors. Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine requires no elaboration. Even among democracies, few match Japan’s restraint.
Japan’s concrete contributions to international order are measurable: approximately $300 billion in development assistance, making it history’s second-largest donor; consistent support for U.N. peacekeeping operations; leadership in global health initiatives, contributing at least $4.5 billion to pandemic response; and technological innovations that have improved hundreds of millions of lives. These actions, not words, define contemporary Japan.
The most troubling aspect of continued apology demands comes from Beijing, where the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) systematically exploits historical memory for regime legitimacy. As Louisa Lim explains in her award-winning 2014 book of nonfiction, “The People’s Republic of Amnesia: Tiananmen Revisited,” the CCP’s attention to history is tenuous at best. For example, Mao Zedong’s ruinous Great Leap Forward (1958-1962) is said to have caused the deaths of 30 million to 45 million Chinese citizens, according to some accounts — many more than Japan’s total death toll in all of World War II.
Indeed, Mao’s Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) destroyed Chinese society more thoroughly than any foreign invasion. Moreover, the ongoing treatment of the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang, involving mass detention of over 1 million Uyghurs, represents contemporary state terror. Yet these events are erased from Chinese textbooks that devote extensive coverage to Japanese actions from eight decades ago.
This historical weaponization serves clear strategic purposes, including deflecting domestic criticism of the CCP and President Xi Jinping, justifying military expansion (China’s defense budget has increased an estimated 700% since 2000) and undermining the U.S.-Japan alliance. When Tokyo apologizes, Beijing immediately incorporates these statements into propaganda narratives portraying Japan as an eternal threat requiring Chinese military preparedness.
South Korea presents a different challenge, requiring nuanced engagement. As a fellow democracy and security partner, Seoul’s concerns merit serious consideration. However, the path forward lies not in repeated apologies but in practical cooperation addressing shared challenges.
First, as part of Tokyo’s reconciliation efforts, it should establish a trilateral security technology initiative with the U.S., Japan and South Korea. By creating a trilateral framework for joint development of critical technologies — including semiconductors, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, with shared intellectual property rights and production facilities — Tokyo could create interdependencies transcending historical grievances.
Second, launching a Northeast Asia democratic resilience forum would formally enhance historical rapprochement. With institutional quarterly meetings of security advisers, foreign ministers and economic officials from Japan, the U.S. and South Korea, the forum could focus on concrete deliverables — including coordinated responses to Chinese economic coercion, joint supply-chain mapping and integrated missile-defense protocols — helping to strengthen shared national interests that serve to overcome bilateral differences.
Third, through the creation of regional educational standards on history, Japan and South Korea could develop common educational frameworks that acknowledge historical complexities while emphasizing shared democratic values and future cooperation. This could include exchange programs for history teachers and joint textbook committees with third-country academic oversight from Canada, Germany or France, friends of Tokyo and Seoul but not alliance partners.
Fourth, implementing economic security partnerships could also act as a ballast in Japan-South Korea bilateral relations. This could be done through the establishment of formal mechanisms for consultation on export controls, investment screening and technology transfer restrictions vis-a-vis China. For example, the two nations could create a $5 billion fund for joint investments in critical minerals processing and renewable energy infrastructure.
Japan’s allies and friends should recognize that demands for perpetual Japanese apologies serve Chinese strategic interests, not their mutual interests. Beijing seeks to keep Japan in a defensive crouch, unable to assume greater regional security responsibilities or challenge Chinese narratives. This directly undermines the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which requires capable and confident allies.
Furthermore, the moral authority underlying apology demands has eroded. No Chinese official who defends Uyghur internment camps, denies the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989 or erases the Cultural Revolution possesses standing to lecture others on historical responsibility. Japan’s open society, with a free press, independent judiciary and vibrant democracy, contrasts starkly with China’s totalitarian system.
The strategic choice is clear: Allies and friends, including the U.S., must champion Japan’s transformation narrative while working with Tokyo and Seoul on concrete initiatives addressing contemporary challenges. This approach serves U.S. interests in Indo-Pacific stability, strengthens democratic alliances against authoritarian challenges and acknowledges the reality that today’s Japan represents not a continuation of its past but its thorough repudiation.
Historical memory matters, but so does recognizing when history has definitively turned a page. For Japan, that turning occurred eight decades ago. The policies of Japan’s allies and friends must acknowledge this reality.
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