The evolution of Canada-Japan relations within Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is a case study of untapped potential and missed opportunities. With shared national interests in preserving an international order based on the rule of law and democracy, the bilateral relationship has made meaningful advances but remains constrained by domestic political turbulence in both countries and unpredictability with the U.S., especially with Donald Trump’s return to the presidency in January.
Canada’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy correctly identified Japan’s strategic importance for Ottawa’s regional ambitions. Concrete achievements have materialized, including the 2023 Canada-Japan Critical Minerals Cooperation Agreement, which represents a substantive step toward securing supply chains for electric vehicle batteries and advanced technologies.
Ottawa has also deployed naval vessels to the region, supporting the enforcement of UN sanctions against North Korea under the umbrella of Operation Neon, and has conducted joint sailings and multilateral exercises with partners such as the U.S., Australia, and the Philippines in the East and South China Seas. It also continues to provide contributions to shared security concerns with Japan through Operation Horizon.
Furthermore, Canada’s naval presence in the Indo-Pacific has been anchored by HMCS Vancouver’s participation in multiple joint exercises including KEEN SWORD with Japan and RIMPAC 2024, where it was joined by additional Canadian assets and personnel. This sustained maritime engagement, continuing with HMCS Ottawa’s deployment from November 2024 to February 2025, demonstrates Canada’s commitment to interoperability with Japan and other regional partners through regular joint naval exercises and port visits.
Canada-Japan trade relations have been resilient thanks in part to the implementation of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), of which both are members. According to Export Development Canada, bilateral trade reached C$35 billion in 2023 despite pandemic disruptions and protectionist headwinds. The CPTPP has effectively created institutional architecture for deepened economic integration while providing both countries partial insulation from Trump’s unpredictable trade tactics.
However, these achievements represent a fraction of the potential collaboration. Canada’s approach has been marked by unfortunate delays and inconsistencies. When then-prime minister Justin Trudeau prorogued Parliament in January 2025 amid declining poll numbers, pending bilateral agreements on cybersecurity and intelligence sharing were shelved indefinitely. This parliamentary reset stalled momentum precisely when accelerated implementation was needed most. As a former Canadian diplomat in Tokyo remarked privately, “When Ottawa hit pause, Tokyo questioned our seriousness.”
From Japan’s perspective, Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru’s precarious political position has similarly constrained bold initiatives. Leading a fractious coalition with approval ratings below 24 per cent, Ishiba has focused overwhelmingly on domestic economic reforms while limiting international commitments that might trigger parliamentary opposition. Consequently, the anticipated expansion of defence technology collaboration under Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) has materialized only minimally.
Both countries have found their diplomatic bandwidth consumed by managing relations with Washington. Trump’s renewed tariffs on Canadian aluminum and steel in February 2025, alongside threats to Japanese automobile exports, have forced Ottawa and Tokyo into reactive postures. Canada’s long-planned expansion of its diplomatic presence in the Indo-Pacific — a centrepiece of its Indo-Pacific Strategy — has been repeatedly deferred as resources are diverted to continental crisis management.
What remains conspicuously absent is a comprehensive Canada-Japan security framework that moves beyond piecemeal co-operation. Australia and Japan signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement in 2022, yet Canadian-Japanese defence cooperation continues through ad hoc arrangements rather than institutionalized channels. This gap exists despite shared concerns about Chinese assertiveness in contested waters and mutual interests in maintaining freedom of navigation.
Energy co-operation represents another missed opportunity. Canada has abundant natural resources that could enhance Japanese energy security amid geopolitical uncertainty, yet regulatory barriers and infrastructure limitations have prevented Canadian liquefied natural gas (LNG) from reaching Japanese markets at scale. The Kitimat LNG project, which could have positioned Canada as a reliable supplier, continues to face delays that Japanese partners find frustrating.
Co-ordination on China policy also remains underdeveloped. While both countries have grown more circumspect regarding Beijing, they rarely synchronize diplomatic responses to regional provocations. When China conducted extended military exercises around Taiwan following U.S. congressional visits in mid-2023, Canadian and Japanese statements diverged notably in tone and substance. This lack of co-ordination undermines the deterrent effect that aligned middle powers might otherwise achieve.
Digital governance is a promising yet underdeveloped area for collaboration. Both countries embrace democratic values in technology regulation, yet have failed to establish joint standards or approaches to data protection that could counter China’s digital authoritarianism.
Looking forward, a recalibrated Canada-Japan relationship requires the political will to overcome both domestic distractions and the gravitational pull of American unpredictability. Three priorities should guide this renewal:
1. Institutionalizing security co-operation through a formal bilateral framework rather than relying on regional or multilateral mechanisms alone;
2. Accelerating critical minerals and clean energy collaboration with concrete infrastructure investments rather than merely declaratory agreements, and;
3. Developing synchronized approaches to economic coercion from larger powers, creating practical resilience rather than rhetorical solidarity.
As middle powers navigating an increasingly complex regional architecture, Canada and Japan share fundamental interests in maintaining an international order based on the rule of law. Their relationship contains the building blocks for a significant strategic partnership, but transforming potential into reality requires sustained political attention that has thus far proven elusive amid domestic turbulence and American unpredictability.
This piece was first published on April 30, 2025, at Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.
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