Excerpt from my paper: The Russian-Ukraine war as a critical juncture: Economic realism and Japan’s new National Security Strategy in Japan and Central Europe: Geopolitics, Security, and Economy

Introduction

In December 2022, Japan unveiled its new National Security Strategy (NSS). Grounded in Japan’s three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of home-based nuclear weapons, the new NSS is both transformative in focusing on counterstrike capabilities and boosting defence spending and consistent with Japan’s deep committed to its post-WW2 Pacifist constitution, the rejection of military force as a legitimate tool of foreign policy, and support for a rules-based order.

In accordance with Japan’s constitution, counterstrikes have been conceived as a minimum necessary measure for self-defence and remain consistent with the Three New Conditions for Use of Force. These are: 1) when an armed attack against Japan occurs or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness; 2) when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people; and 3) use of force limited to the minimum extent necessary. The reasons for acquiring these capabilities are numerous.

In the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and challenges that China assertive policies presents to the region- al order in the Indo-Pacific, this essay will analyse Japan’s economic realism and new NSS, highlighting the precarious balance Japan employs to secure its economic and national security.

The Ukraine-Russia war as a critical juncture

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia on 24 February 2022 was a critical moment for Japanese security thinking. Not only did it disrupt food and energy supply chains, but it demonstrated that authoritarian states and a Machiavellian, might-is-right approach to foreign policy threatens the international rules-based order that has been the foundation for Japan’s and the broader region’s peace, prosperity, and security in the post-WW2 period. For Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, it conveyed the stark reality that “Ukraine today could be East Asia tomorrow”.

Japan’s overarching concern is that China will repeat Russia’s aggression in one or more of the various geopolitical hotspots in the Indo-Pacific. Tokyo’s anxieties are not without reason.

China’s militarization since entering the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 has continued unabated. By way of example, from 2000 to 2010, China’s known military spending increased by at least 10 percent annually. The most contemporary known military budget increase of seven percent for fiscal year 2022 surpassed USD 229 billion. Investments include its extensive anti-access/anti-denial system meant to circumvent the US’s comparative asymmetric naval advantages by lining the east coast of China with “carrier killers” and other offensive systems.

The military exercises conducted around Taiwan in August 2022 following Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island – exer- cises that included naval and land assets such as the Chinese aircraft carriers the Liaoning and the Shandong and at least 75 amphibious assault ships, at least one Type 55 cruiser, and several Type 54 frigates – pose a serious risk to the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that surround Taiwan and are critical arteries to transport import/exports as well as energy resources in and out of Japan.

The SLOCs in the South China Sea are also vulnerable to accidental or intentional disruption following the building and then militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea by China.

The deepening Beijing-Moscow relationship following the invasion of Ukraine, including increased military coordination between Russia and China, and newer-model equipment and the implementation of large-scale military exercises in the Far East region has led Tokyo to similar conclusions to those of Michał Bogusz, Jakub Jakóbowski, and Witold Rodkiewicz in their report “The Beijing-Moscow axis: The foundations of an asymmetric alliance”. For Tokyo, the Russian-Chinese quasi-alliance is a strategic convergence of Beijing’s and Moscow’s priorities to strengthen their strategic positions vis-à-vis the US. By “simultaneous aggressive policies – Russia in Europe, and China in the Indo-Pacific”, they each seek to dilute Washington’s limited resources “to put an end to the dominant role of the United States and Western institutions on the international arena, and to create a favourable international environment for the survival of their authoritarian regimes”.

Kyiv’s willingness to defend itself against Russian aggression has garnered support from the US, the EU, Japan, South Korea, and Australia in terms of providing additional military and non-military resources to defend Ukraine. This is in addition to the diplomatic coordination that has occurred to pressure Moscow with financial and other sanctions. Ukraine’s unexpected success in defending its territory from Russia’s invasion has planted into the minds of security planners in Tokyo the importance of investing in Japan’s security instead of just depending on its alliance partner, the US, to come to its aid in the case of a conflict involving North Korea, Taiwan, or the East China and South China Seas. Simply, if Tokyo is not willing to defend itself, why should it expect the US to shed blood on its behalf?

Moreover, Tokyo has seen Ukraine’s absence from multi- lateral security, economic, and other frameworks as part of the explanation for Russia’s willingness to invade Ukraine. As a result, Tokyo continues to deepen its alliance partnership with the US, to diversify its security partnerships through reciprocal access agreements (RAA) with the UK and Australia, and to expand its leadership and cooperation within the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). It has even formed new Quad minilateral cooperative partnerships with the US, Australia, and the Philippines.

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